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The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause grants criminal
defendants the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against"
them. A strict readingof this text would transform the criminaljustice
landscape by prohibitingthe prosecution'suse of hearsay at trial. But
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until recently, the Supreme Court's interpretationof the Clause was
closer to the opposite. By tying the confrontation right to traditional
hearsay exceptions, the Court's longstanding precedents granted
prosecutors broad freedom to use out-of-court statements to convict
criminal defendants.
The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington
was supposed to change all that. By severing the link between the Sixth
Amendment and the hearsay rules, Crawford "ushered in a revolution
in the world of evidence and criminalprosecutions."Butthe excitement
did not last. Shifting majorities filled in the details of Crawford's lofty
rhetoric, muddying the distinction between the new jurisprudenceand
what had gone before.
This Article takes stock of the "Crawford Revolution." First, it
explores changes in confrontation doctrine since 2004 and examines,
as a theoretical matter, how those changes map onto the state and
federal hearsay exceptions that Crawford purportedly rendered
irrelevant to constitutional analysis. This interplay between the
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause is critical. The
constitutional right would seem to have little significance if all it does
is bar evidence that is alreadyforbidden by nonconstitutionalhearsay
rules. Second, the Article reports the results of an empirical survey
designed to test the theory by carefully cataloguing the hearsay
pathways thatgenerated ConfrontationClause challenges in hundreds
of federal and state cases. The findings reveal an underappreciated
role of the modern confrontation right, and changes to that role after
2004.
INTRODUCTION

Criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against" them is one of the Constitution's most
is anything but
application
directives.1 ' Yet its
precise
2
courts permit
text,
Amendment's
the
Despite
straightforward.
of absent
statements
other
but
not
some
to
introduce
prosecutors
in
longstanding
only
constant
The
prosecutions.
in
criminal
witnesses
efforts to interpret the Confrontation Clause is the difficulty of
drawing the constitutional dividing line.

1.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

2. See John G. Douglass, Confrontingthe Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 1797, 1817 n.69 (2001) ("The problem of applying the Confrontation Clause to
hearsay is among the most perplexing dilemmas of constitutional criminal
procedure.").
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The high-water mark for the confrontation right came early,
appearing in the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr. 3 Presiding over the
case, Chief Justice John Marshall rejected the prosecution's attempt
to introduce the out-of-court statements of one of Burr's
coconspirators. 4 Marshall thought the logic of this ruling was selfevident. 5 It made little sense for Burr to have a "constitutional claim
to be confronted with the witnesses against him," Marshall explained,
"if mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence
against him." 6
Marshall also referenced a different source of authority to support
his ruling: "The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay
testimony[.]" 7 Then, as now, constitutional protections against the
admission of out-of-court statements paralleled the hearsay rules that
apply in all American jurisdictions.8 For criminal defendants, these
doctrines work in tandem when a prosecutor tries to introduce an outof-court statement, such as a recorded 911 call that states that the
suspect "had a gun." The defense can object that the statement is
inadmissible hearsay and that its introduction violates the
Confrontation Clause. 9 The defendant does not care which of these
theories sways the court; success on either ground results in the
statement's exclusion. By the same token, since the hearsay rules
already prohibit many out-of-court statements, the confrontation
right struggles for relevance. The right becomes redundant to the

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
Id. at 193.
5. Id.
6. Id. Marshall considered a potential exception for coconspirator statements
but rejected its application in that case where no conspiracy was charged. Id. at 19395.
7. Id. at 193 ("The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony, which
excludes from trials of a criminal or civil nature the declarations of any other
individual than of him against whom the proceedings are instituted, has been
generally deemed all essential to the correct administration of justice.").
8. See infra Part II.
9. See Jonathan J. O'Konek, To Object or Not Object, That Is the Question: A
Criminal Law Practitioner'sGuide to the "FiveW's"of Evidentiary Objections, 95 N.D.
L. REv. 155, 172 (2020) (advising that "in situations where the prosecutor does not call
a witness to testify at trial, but still attempts to admit this witness' testimonial out of
court statement, defense attorneys should lodge both hearsay and Confrontation
Clause objections"); see also Robert Bartels, The Hearsay Rule, the Confrontation
Clause, and Reversible Error in Criminal Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 967, 978 (1994)
(arguing that an objection on one ground should be automatically considered an
objection on both for purposes of preserving the issue on appeal).
3.
4.
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extent it simply bars evidence that is already inadmissible under
nonconstitutional evidence rules.
Until 2004, redundancy was the primary critique of the Supreme
Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence.
The doctrine,
crystallized in the 1980 case Ohio v. Roberts, permitted statements
admitted under "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" even without
confrontation. 10 Since modern hearsay exceptions are modeled on
longstanding common law analogues,11 Roberts left little role for the
confrontation right.12 Already bound by hearsay rules, prosecutors
were rarely troubled by the Confrontation Clause.1 3
The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington
sought to change all that.1 4 Crawford rejected the proposition that
"the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence[.]"15 In a celebrated opinion authored
by Justice Scalia, "the unlikely friend of criminal defendants,"1 6 the
Court fashioned a new framework that "ended the 'shotgun wedding'
of hearsay and confrontation" and "detached the meaning of the
Clause from the hearsay rule." 17 The Court insisted that the two
sources of authority-hearsay rules and the confrontation rightspoke to distinct questions. 18 The hearsay rules sought to guarantee
10. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.").
11. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's introductory note; Jeffrey
Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 33-35 (2013) (describing drafting of federal
hearsay rules).
12. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay'sLast Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 ("For
a quarter century, in fact, the application of the Confrontation Clause closely tracked
hearsay doctrine.").
13. See sources cited infra note 49 and discussion in text.

14. Michael S. Pardo, Confrontation After Scalia and Kennedy, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 757, 758 (2019) ("Justice Scalia's 2004 opinion in Crawford v. Washington
ushered in a revolution in the world of evidence and criminal prosecutions.").
15. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
16 Stephanos Bibas, Originalismand Formalism in CriminalProcedure:The Triumph
of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friendof Criminal Defendants, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184
(2005) (noting that while Justice Scalia was "long the darling of tough-on-crime
conservatives," he exhibited a "a libertarian, pro-defendant streak" demonstrated in

Crawford).
17. Sklansky, supra note 12, at 4 ("Unlike the test it supplanted, the rule
announced and applied in the Crawford line of cases has been roundly praised, in
significant part because it is thought to have 'detached the meaning of the Clause from
the hearsay rule."') (citing Richard D. Friedman, The ConfrontationRight Across the
Systemic Divide, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN DAMA8KA 266
(John Jackson et al. eds., 2008)).
18. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
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the reliability of out-of-court statements introduced in trial
proceedings. The Confrontation Clause "commands, not that evidence
be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 19
Commentators cheered the "Crawfordrevolution" as a victory for
criminal defendants and a landmark reinvigoration of a long dormant
constitutional right. 20 To build the Crawford majority, however,
Justice Scalia left many details of the new jurisprudence for "another
day." 21 In subsequent cases, the Crawford majority splintered. 22 The
distinction between the Court's new approach and the reviled Roberts
test began to blur.23 While a new majority claimed to be faithfully
applying Crawford, Justice Scalia detected something ominous. In a
2015 concurring opinion, he forecasted the revolution's demise-a fate
he thought sealed by the new majority's cryptic hints at a renewed
connection to the hearsay rules. Justice Scalia warned: "A suspicious
mind (or even one that is merely not naive) might regard this
distortion as the first step in an attempt to smuggle longstanding
hearsay exceptions back into the Confrontation Clause-in other
words, an attempt to return to Ohio v. Roberts."24
As things stand, Justice Scalia's accusation is the last word in
confrontation jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has not decided a
confrontation case since 2015. It appears that the doctrine has settled.
Or, more precisely, the Supreme Court has abandoned its unfinished
business to the lower courts. 25 Five years later, it is time to assess
where things stand.

19. Id. at 61.
20. See Liesa L. Richter, Don't Just Do Something: E-Hearsay, the Present Sense
Impression, and the Case for Caution in the Rulemaking Process, 61 AM. U. L.
REV. 1657, 1691 (2012) (discussing the "Crawford Revolution"); sources cited infra
note 54.
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
22. Pardo, supra note 14, at 759 ("The decade following Crawford, however,
produced sharp divisions and significant backlash within the Supreme Court's
confrontation jurisprudence, as the Court struggled to implement further doctrinal
details.").
23. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 1865, 1867 (2012) (chronicling negative consensus regarding Roberts and gradual
blurring of distinction between the two doctrines).
24. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 253 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. Cf. David L. Noll, Constitutional Evasion and the Confrontation Puzzle,
56 B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1902-03 (2015) ("The leading academic proponent of
Crawford suggests it may take decades for doctrine to reach a stable equilibrium.
Others describe post-Crawfordjurisprudence as a 'debacle,' 'train wreck,' and 'mess."'
(citations omitted)).
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This Article explores, on a theoretical and empirical basis,
whether the confrontation right has, as Justice Scalia suspected, once
again become a paper tiger-a protection rendered largely redundant
through its overlap with existing hearsay protections. Specifically, we
analyze the numerous pathways through the hearsay rules that
prosecutors can use to introduce out-of-court statements against
criminal defendants. Then, we consider, as a theoretical matter, the
likelihood that evidence introduced through those pathways would
violate the Confrontation Clause as it is now interpreted by the
Supreme Court. Our analysis reveals only one pathway that seems
likely to lead to Confrontation Clause violations: the hearsay
exception for statements against interest. 26 All other viable conduits
for the admission of out-of-court statements appear likely to yield few
(if any) statements whose admission would violate the narrowing
confrontation right.
But that is just theory. To test how well this theory matches
reality, we surveyed the case law since the last Supreme Court case
on the topic in mid-2015. Specifically, we categorized every federal
appellate decision, all published federal trial court decisions, and a
sample of unpublished federal trial court decisions between mid-2015
and the end of 2020 that ruled on the admissibility of out-of-court
statements under the Confrontation Clause. We also extended our
survey to a sample of state cases. Our analysis of the resulting data
set (over 400 cases overall) largely bore out the predictions of our
theoretical framework, but it also offered a few surprises.
As predicted from the theoretical overlap of the hearsay rules and
the modern confrontation right, we found few successful
Confrontation Clause challenges to out-of-court statements properly
admitted under the hearsay rules. Of historical interest, the most
common modern Confrontation Clause challenge mirrors the
challenge made by Aaron Burr in his treason trial. Defendants in our
sample most frequently raised Confrontation Clause challenges to the
admission of co-conspirator statements. But, unlike in the Burr trial,
and as predicted by'our theoretical analysis, the courts rejected every
27
challenge to the admission of these "mere verbal declarations."
In terms of the types of challenges and the likely success of those
challenges, we detected intriguing patterns. Successful Confrontation
Clause challenges regularly arose in scenarios where the admission of
out-of-court statements also violated the nonconstitutional hearsay
rules. In fact, almost every Confrontation Clause violation identified

26.
27.

See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
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by our survey paralleled a violation of the jurisdiction's underlying
hearsay rules. We found only one case where the admission of an outof-court statement satisfied the jurisdiction's hearsay rules but
nonetheless violated the Confrontation Clause. This finding suggests
the same type of redundancy that existed under Roberts. But our
study also shows that redundancy matters. The survey revealed a
surprising number of Confrontation Clause violations that stemmed
from trial court mistakes in interpreting aspects of hearsay doctrine,
especially the public records hearsay exception and the hearsay
definition.
Our findings raise several important implications. First, as a
practical matter, Crawford has turned out to be more of a modest
course correction than a revolution. Justice Scalia's accusation that
the confrontation right is reverting to its familiar role as an
understudy to the hearsay rules finds support in our survey. This
reversion is troubling because it is non-transparent. Under Roberts,
the jurisprudence explicitly tied the constitutional test to "firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions"; 28 modern confrontation doctrine reaches
a similar result in a roundabout fashion. But we also find hints that
the confrontation right has less visible but important effects, such as
clearly cutting off a few discrete pathways for the admission of out-ofcourt statements. 29

Our analysis also suggests that there are aspects of the evolving
confrontation right that commentators like Justice Scalia overlooked.
Once revealed, these aspects seem intuitive, but they are easy to miss.
"Hearsay is commonly viewed as the most difficult topic in the rules
of evidence, and one of the most perplexing in all of law."30
Consequently, errors in trial courts' application of the hearsay rules
should not be viewed as uninteresting outliers. To the extent such
errors

are

common

(and our

survey

suggests

they

are),

the

Confrontation Clause's backstop role becomes a significant feature of
the evidentiary landscape.
Finally, we find that the type of backstop offered by Crawford
differs from the one previously provided by Ohio v. Roberts.3 1 PostCrawford confrontation doctrine restricts the admission of relatively
formal statements, typically generated by the government in

28. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.").
29. See infra Part IV.
30. 30B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & JEFFREY BELLIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, iii (2020 ed.).
31. See infra PartI.
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anticipation of trial.32 This focus comes through in the surprising
number of Confrontation Clause violations we found that arose from
evidence admitted (erroneously) under the public records hearsay
exception. 33 When the public records exception is used improperly, an
occurrence we found with surprising frequency, the product is an
easily recognizable Confrontation Clause violation. 34 This would not
have been the case under Roberts, which sought to exclude not formal
out-of-court statements but unreliable ones. The benefit of this shift,
from a defense perspective, is that it forces the government to
introduce live testimony to prove critical elements of criminal offenses
like a drunk driver's blood alcohol content or the chemical composition
of an illegal narcotic. The cost is that Crawford's new focus eliminates
any remaining constitutional barriers to the admission of casual
remarks like those uttered orally or in social media and text messages
- the modern equivalent of Chief Justice Marshall's "mere verbal
declarations."3 5
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers a brief summary
of confrontation doctrine, focusing on the transition from Roberts to
Crawford and the narrowing of the reinvigorated confrontation right
in the cases that followed. 36 Part II introduces the modern hearsay
framework and highlights the pathways for admission of out-of-court
statements in American trials. 37 It then analyzes these pathways to
determine whether evidence that can be introduced under the hearsay
rules is likely to result in a Confrontation Clause violation. This
analysis generates specific predictions of what we would expect to find
in criminal cases after 2015. Part III tests the hypothesis presented
in Part II by presenting the results of our empirical survey of federal
and state cases.3 8 Finally, Part IV explores the implications of our
findings. 39 Our study reveals a confrontation right that is playing a
smaller role than either Chief Justice Marshall (circa 1807) or the
Crawford opinion (circa 2004) envisioned. But the right still
and
in
nuanced
landscape
evidentiary
the
influences
underappreciated ways.
32.
33.

See infra Part I.
See FED. R. EvID. 803(8).

34.

See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 937 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2019); United

States v. Cerda-Ramirez, 730 F. App'x 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Esparza, 791 F.3d 1067, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2015).
35. See infra Part I; see also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (No. 14,694).
36. See infra Part I.

37.
38.

See-infra Part II.
See infra PartIII.

39.

See infra Part IV.
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HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT

Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a trial judge in Aaron Burr's
treason trial, suggested that hearsay would rarely be admissible in a
criminal trial. 40 Our empirical survey, however, shows the opposite,
including prosecutors' regular use of the very type of hearsay
Marshall condemned. This Part explains how American courts moved
from Marshall's strict interpretation of the Confrontation Clause to a
less restrictive modern reality.
The Supreme Court's first significant Confrontation Clause ruling
came in 1895 in Mattox v. United States. There, the Court turned
away a Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of a
transcript of a deceased witness's trial testimony. 41 Since the
defendant in Mattox had previously cross-examined the absent
declarant, the Court rejected "technical adherence to the letter of [the]
constitutional provision" in favor of "the necessities of the case."42
Mattox's primary significance was its recognition that the
confrontation right bars some, but not all, out-of-court statements
offered against a defendant at trial. 43 The Supreme Court has
navigated a middle course ever since. 44 Some hearsay is
constitutionally prohibited, and some is permitted. The line
separating the two has proven difficult to draw.
After a century of ad hoc decisions, the Supreme Court first offered
a comprehensive dividing line in Ohio v. Roberts decided in 1980.45
The 6-3 opinion declared that a judicial finding of reliability-which
could be established through the application of a "firmly-rooted"
hearsay exception-sufficed to overcome Confrontation Clause
objections. 46 Under Roberts,

40.
41.
42.
43.

See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 694).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
Id.
Mattox supported its point by pointing to the admission of dying declarations.

Id.
44. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 66 n.9 (1980).
45. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
46. Id.; see Leslie Cahill, Witnesses in the Confrontation and Self-Incrimination
Clauses: The Constitution's FraternalTwins, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 160-61 (2019)
("Roberts thus equated the Confrontation Clause with the law of evidence, where a
court's determination that a statement satisfied an established hearsay exception
would simultaneously fulfill the constitutional mandate.").
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[P]rosecutors could generally assume that any
evidence that could overcome a hearsay objection
Confrontation Clause
would similarly survive
challenge. Federal courts deemed most hearsay
exceptions contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and analogous state evidence codes to be "firmly
rooted." Even when that was not the case, the evidence
was still easily admitted. Hearsay exceptions that were
not firmly rooted in the historical record typically
required something akin to the "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" that served as an
alternative route to satisfying Roberts' reliability
test.

47

The widely criticized Roberts framework left the confrontation
right a pale shadow of the protection that Chief Justice Marshall
envisioned. After Roberts, "mere verbal declarations"48 could routinely
be offered against the accused as long as they fit a traditional hearsay
exception. This rendered the confrontation right largely redundant,
backstopping the familiar state law hearsay prohibitions that long ago
took root in American jurisdictions. 49
Something unexpected happened in 2004. In Crawford v.
Washington, the Supreme Court scrapped Roberts.50 Liberal Justices
joined with conservatives, signing onto an opinion crafted by Justice
Scalia that breathed new life into the confrontation right.51 "Crawford
was a victory not just for criminal defendants, but for the Constitution
as well." 52 Not only did the case raise the hurdles for prosecution
evidence, it strengthened the doctrine's legitimacy by tying it to the
Sixth Amendment text. In a remarkable development, considering

47. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6704, at 25-26.
48. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
49. Jerry P. Coleman, How A Conservative Supreme Court Justice Rocked the
Criminal Evidence World by Giving Defendants New Constitutional Rights: The
Legacy of 2004's Crawford v. Washington, 53 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) (former
practitioner describing ease with which hearsay could be admitted under Roberts);
Richard D. Friedman, Rescued from the Grave and Then Covered with Mud: Justice
Scalia and the Unfinished Restoration of the ConfrontationRight, 101 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 39, 40 (2016) ("The Roberts doctrine, especially as it was developed by
subsequent cases, virtually constitutionalized contemporary conceptions of the law of
hearsay.").
50. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) ("The Crawford rule is flatly
inconsistent with the prior governing president, Roberts, which Crawfordoverruled.").
51. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
52. Bellin, supra note 23, at 1867.
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that the Court was overruling decades of precedent, seven Justices
joined the opinion. No longer would the constitutional analysis turn
on the hearsay rules or a judicial finding of reliability, the Court
triumphantly announced: "The only indicium of reliability sufficient
to satisfy constitutional demands, is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation." 53
The ruling's potential was reflected in the excitement it generated
among insiders. Defense attorneys and scholars celebrated the case. 54
Prosecutors warned that Crawford created major new obstacles to
prosecutions for offenses ranging from drunk driving to drug offenses
to domestic violence to murder.5 5 The Court's response to these
warnings was poignant. Obstacles to prosecution was a feature not a
bug. "The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of
53. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69. Crawford emphasized that the Sixth Amendment's
"core concerns" differed from those of the hearsay rules. Id. at 51; see Sklansky, supra
note 12, at 4 (Crawford "ended the 'shotgun wedding' of hearsay and confrontation").
Writing before Michigan v. Bryant and Ohio v. Clark, Sklansky presciently noted that
although Crawford"severed the operationallink between hearsay and confrontation,"
the decision "left intact, and actually strengthened, the historical link between
hearsay and confrontation: the idea that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rule share the same origins and the same thrust." Id. at 4-5.
54. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 16, at 192 (describing Crawford as "a successful
blend of originalism and formalism" that announced a rule that "turns on simple, clear
requirements of testimony, cross-examination, and unavailability, rather than ad hoc
estimates of reliability"); Jeffrey L. Fisher, CategoricalRequirements in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1496 (2006) (describing Crawford as a
"significant victor[y]" for the "criminal defense bar" that "restored clarity to
confrontation law"); Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of
"Testimonial", 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 273 (2005) (arguing that Crawford"represent[s]
a great and beneficial development"); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750, 767 (2005) (stating that Crawford's "reasoning is
difficult to refute, and its fealty to early constitutional history is admirable"; it is "a
salutary development in confrontation law"); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v.
Washington: Encouragingand Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH.
L. REV. 511, 512, 522 (2005) (explaining that Crawford has "given real teeth to the
Confrontation Clause in several frequently encountered and important situations" and
forecasting "a future in which substantially more confrontation may be provided");
Roger C. Park, PurposeAs a Guide to the Interpretationof the Confrontation Clause,
71 BROOK. L. REV. 297, 297 (2005) ("I applaud the change from Ohio v. Roberts to
Crawford v. Washington ... ."); Robert M. Pitler, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the
Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12-13
(2005) (recounting post-Crawford exuberance among attorneys and scholars involved
in the case, as well as in newspaper reports).
55. See Lininger, supra note 54, at 749 ("[W]ithin days-even hours--of the
Crawford decision, prosecutors were dismissing or losing hundreds of domestic
violence cases that would have presented little difficulty in the past." (footnote
omitted)).
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criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to
trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Confrontation Clause-like those other constitutional provisions-is
binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience." 56
Crawford promised a reinvigorated confrontation right that could
once again make a difference in criminal trials, since it would no
longer simply parallel existing hearsay rules. 57 David Sklansky
summarized the "conventional understanding" of Crawford: "No
longer 'shrouded by the hearsay rule,' confrontation doctrine can
develop independently-and, with luck, more sensibly." 58
Crawford directed lower courts to determine whether hearsay
offered by the prosecution was "testimonial," rather than whether it
qualified for admission under "firmly rooted" hearsay rules. 59 For
testimonial evidence, the Sixth Amendment required confrontation,
with only a few historical exceptions. 60 By "testimonial evidence" the
Court explained that it meant things like "ex parte in-court testimony
or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable . to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."6 1 But
in a critical omission, the Court did not define testimonial, stating:
"We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial."'62 The Crawford Court also declined to
resolve the treatment of nontestimonial hearsay. Later cases gave a
definitive answer. "[T]he Confrontation Clause has no application to
such statements. .. "63
The Supreme Court's decision to severely restrict testimonial
hearsay and leave non-testimonial hearsay completely unregulated
placed massive pressure on the dividing line. In later cases, a narrow
definition of "testimonial" emerged. 64 Although the Court offered
56. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2009).
57. Lininger, supra note 54, at 750 ("Statutory hearsay law is now misaligned
").
with constitutional confrontation law ...
58. Sklansky, supra note 12, at 4.

59.

WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6704, at 26 ("This formulation left no

room for traditional hearsay rules.").
60. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
61. See id.

62. Id. at 68.
63. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007).
64. Bellin, supra note 23, at 1868 (2012) ("The current Supreme Court's
conclusion that the Confrontation Clause addresses only 'testimonial' statements, in
concert with its pointed narrowing of the definition of 'testimonial,' results in the
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varying formulations, its most recent cases, Michigan v. Bryant65 and
Ohio v. Clark,66 settle on a formula that favors the prosecution. The
only statements that qualify as "testimonial" are those "procured with
*a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony." 67 Although earlier opinions employed a more flexible
standard, the Court's most recent Confrontation Clause opinion, Ohio
v. Clark, repeats this "out-of-court substitute for trial testimony"
formula in its introduction and conclusion, 68 summarizing that: "In
the end, the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances,
viewed objectively, the 'primary purpose' of the conversation was to
'creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."' 69 As explained
below, most out-of-court statements admissible under the hearsay
rules do not meet this definition. Consequently, they will be
admissible-as a constitutional matter-even when the defendant
has no opportunity to confront the out-of-court declarant.
The "testimonial" definition does capture two important types of
potential prosecution evidence: statements obtained during formal
police interrogations and expert analysis offered in affidavit form, as
in cases requiring proof of the chemical composition of an illegal
narcotic or a defendant's blood alcohol content. 70 With one exception
discussed below, out-of-court statements in these genres, however, are
typically inadmissible under traditional hearsay rules. Thus, with
respect to the bulk of admissible hearsay statements, this narrow
"testimonial" definition dramatically reduces the significance of the
confrontation right.

elimination (not strengthening) of the constitutional restrictions on the bulk of
admissible hearsay.").
65. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).
66. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245 (2015).
67. Id. at 245; see also Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358 ("[A] statement is not procured
with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.").
"[C]ertain statements are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a
prosecution .... " Bryant, 562 U.S. at 362 n.9.
-68. Clark, 576 U.S. at 245, 250-51 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358) ("[W]e ask
whether a statement was given with the 'primary purpose of creating an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony.'").
69. Id. at 245 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358).
70. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 651-52, 657 (2011) (lab report
reporting defendant's blood alcohol content); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 308-09, 311, 329 (2009) (certificate attesting that the drugs were cocaine);
see also Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56-59 (2012) (the Court rejecting a
constitutional challenge in a recent case involving expert analysis of a DNA sample,
producing no majority opinion, and leaving the law in this area essentially
unchanged).
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Adding to the problem for criminal defendants, the most recent
confrontation cases pair the narrow "testimonial" definition with
hints at a renewed constitutional role for the hearsay rules. This
language is most prominent in Michigan v. Bryant.7 1 There, the
shifting majority announced that: "In making the primary purpose
determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some
statements as reliable, will be relevant." 72 This followed an earlier
passage in the majority opinion that tied the Confrontation Clause
analysis to the elements of the excited utterance hearsay exception. 73
In a footnote, the Court further tethered the Confrontation Clause and
hearsay analysis,'stating, "[mjany other exceptions to the hearsay
rules similarly rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their
nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and
therefore should not be barred by hearsay prohibitions." 74 The
footnote signals that out-of-court statements admitted under these
exceptions, including the exception for co-conspirator statements (as
in the Burr trial) and statements against interest (relied on by the
prosecution in Crawford), will be admissible without confrontation. 7 5
The Bryant majority must have been aware that this dicta resonated
not with Crawford, but with the decision that case overruled, Ohio v.
Roberts. It was no surprise, then, that the Court's clear effort to
reconnect "the standard hearsay exceptions and exemption from the
confrontation requirement" drew Justice Scalia's wrath.76 Dissenting,
Justice Scalia wrote:

71.

Bryant, 562 U.S. at 357-59.

72. Id. at 358-59.
73. See id. at 361.
This logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance
exception in hearsay law. Statements 'relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition' are considered reliable
because the declarant, in the excitement, presumably cannot form
a falsehood.
Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 362 n.9.
75. Id. ("See, e.g., Fed. Rules Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (statement by a co-conspirator
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy); 803(4) (statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment); 803(6) (records of regularly conducted activity);
803(8) (public records and reports); 803(9) (records of vital statistics); 803(11) (records
of religious organizations); 803(12) (marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates);
803(13) (family records); 804(b)(3) (statement against interest)" .. .. ).
76. Id. at 392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Is it possible that the Court does not recognize the
contradiction between its focus on reliable statements
and Crawford's focus on testimonial ones? Does it not
realize that the two cannot coexist? Or does it intend,
by following today's illogical roadmap, to resurrect
Roberts by a thousand unprincipled distinctions
without ever explicitly overruling Crawford?77
Still buzzing four years later, Justice Scalia continued this critique in
a concurring opinion in Ohio v. Clark: "A suspicious mind (or even one
that is merely not naive) might regard this distortion. [of the postCrawford jurisprudence] as the first step in an attempt to smuggle
longstanding hearsay exceptions back into the Confrontation
Clause-in other words, an attempt to return to Ohio v. Roberts."78
The late Justice's critique stands as the last word in the Supreme
Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The unfinished
interpretive task now shifts to the lower courts. It is in these courts
that the charge levied by Justice Scalia must be evaluated. Has the
doctrine developed the robust protections against prosecution hearsay
envisioned in Crawford, reverted to the prosecution-friendly Ohio v.
Roberts test, or evolved into something else entirely?

II. THE MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE HEARSAY RULES
Ohio v. Roberts made the relationship between the hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause straightforward. After Crawford, we get
mixed messages. Crawford claimed to sever the connection. 79 Later
cases, however, undermined that claim, drawing a rebuke from
Crawford's author. 80 This Part seeks to resolve the dispute,
comprehensively analyzing the connection between the hearsay rules
and the confrontation right as it stands after the Court's most recent
confrontation decision in Ohio v. Clark.81
As explained below, our analysis concludes that few statements
that are admissible under the traditional hearsay framework will be
vulnerable to exclusion under the modern Confrontation Clause. The
primary reason for the overlap of the confrontation right and the
hearsay rules is the Supreme Court's narrow definition of
77. Id. at 392-93.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 253 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See supra Part I.
See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 379-95 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Clark, 576 U.S. at 237-56.
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"testimonial." Consistent with both the Court's hints in Bryant and
Justice Scalia's warning in the same case, 82 out-of-court statements
admissible through traditional hearsay rules will rarely fit the
definition of "testimonial." In addition, the Court has carved out a
series of specific exceptions from the Confrontation Clause's
protections even for testimonial statements. Those rulings further
limit the likelihood that a statement will be admissible under the
hearsay rules but barred by the Confrontation Clause. Finally, the
Supreme Court also excludes out-of-court statements offered for
something other than their truth-statements that do not constitute
"hearsay" under traditional evidence rules-from Confrontation
Clause scrutiny. 83
Our analysis demonstrating the extensive overlap between the
modern confrontation right and the hearsay rules is set out step by
step below. Specifically, we apply a constitutional lens to every
potential avenue a prosecutor can use to introduce out-of-court
statements under nonconstitutional evidence rules. We use the
Federal Rules of Evidence to model our analysis, as those rules apply
to trials in federal courts and serve as the template for most state
evidence rules. 84
A. Statements Not Offered for the Truth of the MatterAsserted
The evidence rules in every American jurisdiction prohibit
hearsay. 85 These rules define "hearsay" as an out-of-court statement
offered to prove "the truth of the matter asserted" by the out-of-court
speaker (the "declarant").86 A corollary to this definition is that when
an out-of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, it avoids the hearsay prohibition. 87 This logic creates

82. See supra Part I.
83. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004).
84. See Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867,
872 (2018) ("[F]orty-five states and Puerto Rico have all adopted or modeled their own
rules on the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
85. See Bellin, supra note 11 at 27 n.78 (2013) ("The now-codified prohibition,
with its many discrete exceptions, is the most distinctive feature of American evidence
law."); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalizationof Hearsay: The Extent to
Which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the
Hearsay Rules, 76 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1992) ("[E]very American jurisdiction
currently recognizes a form of the rule against hearsay."); cf. Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (referencing "[t]he hearsay rule, which has long been
recognized and respected by virtually every State").
86. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
87. See id.
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a common pathway for the admission of out-of-court statements made
by absent (i.e., non-testifying) declarants.
Since, as we will see, even courts get this analysis wrong, it may
be helpful to offer an example. Imagine that an anonymous 911 caller
reports that, "a guy driving a blue car with an 'Abolish Police' bumper
sticker just hit a bicyclist and drove away." A recording of the call
would be hearsay if offered as evidence of the offense at a later hitand-run trial. But if the defendant claimed that the police pulled him
over to harass him for the "Abolish Police" bumper sticker, the call
becomes relevant for another purpose. The prosecutor could introduce
the call to explain why the police stopped the defendant's car as
opposed to others in the vicinity of the collision. Whether or not the
caller was being truthful, the call helps to explain why the police acted
as they did. That means the recorded call is relevant for something
other than "the truth of the matter asserted," and is not hearsay.88
Paralleling the hearsay rules' treatment of out-of-court
statements, the Supreme Court states in a footnote in Crawford that,
"The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." 89
Consequently, a common pathway for introducing out-of-court
statements under the hearsay rules-offering statements like the 911
call described above for something other than the truth of the matter
asserted-is not restricted by the Confrontation Clause. 90
B. Statements of a Testifying Witness
Even when evidence fits the hearsay definition as an out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted, there are

88. See infra Part III.B.6.
89. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9; see also Tennessee v. Street,
471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) (emphasizing that the "nonhearsayaspect" of an out-of-court
statement required confrontation only of the person who relayed the statement, not
the statement's declarant). This was the rule under Roberts and has carried over after
Crawford. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (explaining that the
Confrontation Clause is triggered when a statement of "a hearsay declarant is not
present for cross-examination at trial"). Interestingly, Crawford's perspective shift to
the understanding of the right at the time of the Framing complicates what was once
a simple rule. The hearsay definition has narrowed between the time of the Framing
and the modern era. See WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6724, at 76, 78, 80-82
(2017) (describing changes). But the potential mismatch between the Confrontation
Clause and the evidence rules' definitions of hearsay has not (yet) garnered any notice
in the Supreme Court or lower court opinions.

90.

See infra Part III.B.6.
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numerous evidence rules that may permit its admission. 9 1 The first
listed exemptions in the federal rules concern prior statements of
testifying witnesses. 92 These exemptions for a witness's prior
inconsistent and consistent statements, as well as prior statements of
identification, all require the declarant to testify. 93
Statements introduced under these rules face no resistance from
the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that the
out-of-court declarant's presence as a witness at trial resolves any
Confrontation Clause objection. 94 The Court reaffirmed this point in
Crawford, again in a footnote, stating that "when the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
statements."95 Consequently, hearsay admitted under the hearsay
exemptions for prior statements of a testifying witness will not create
any potential for a Confrontation Clause violation. 96
C. Statements of a Party
A defendant's own statements are among the most damaging outof-court statements prosecutors can offer at trial: "the trial equivalent
of a deadly weapon." 97 These statements are typically introduced to
prove the truth of the matter asserted (e.g., "I robbed the bank") and
so are technically hearsay. Nevertheless, they are admitted in
American jurisdictions, when offered by the prosecution, under a
hearsay exemption for statements of an opposing party.98
Although the Supreme Court has not directly resolved this issue,
it seems clear that there is no confrontation problem with offering the
defendant's own statements even when the defendant does not testify
at the trial. There are problems with the hearsay exemption as a

91. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803.
92. See FED R. EVID. 801(d)(1). The rules define certain statements as "not
hearsay" even if they fall within the hearsay definition. Id. Nothing turns on this
nomenclature.

93.

See id.

94. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970).
95. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004).
96. There is a small subset of cases that arise where a witness testifies, but due
to lack of memory or other reasons is arguably not available for cross-examination.
The Supreme Court largely closed off challenges along these lines in United States v.
Owens, where it stated, "[o]rdinarily a witness is regarded as 'subject to crossexamination' when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to
questions." 484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988).
97. United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2).
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practical matter. 99 But it is hard to argue that the defendant has a
constitutional claim to confront the declarant when the defendant is
the declarant.
Importantly, the evidence rules admit not only direct statements
of a party, but also a series of indirect opposing party statements,
under subsections (A) through (E) of the party opponent rule. 100 The
various subsections trigger distinct Confrontation Clause analysis.
With respect to the first two provisions, statements of a party (A) and
adopted admissions (B), there is no Confrontation Clause problem
following the logic sketched above. The statements are admitted as
the parties' own statements, and criminal defendants have never been
afforded the right to confront themselves.
Few statements admitted under the next subsection (C)statements "made by a person whom the party authorized to make a
statement on the subject" 10 1 -- could conceivably violate the
Confrontation Clause. The exception can apply to circumstances
where the party did not authorize the precise wording of an
incriminating statement made by, for example, the defendant's broker
or attorney. But even in those cases, the statement will likely not be
testimonial (created as a substitute for trial testimony). And playing
out the scenario, the universe of testimonial hearsay statements made
by a defendant's spokesperson offered at trial by the prosecution in
lieu of the actual declarant seems vanishingly small. A similar pattern
repeats for statements of an employee or agent made during the
course of employment, subsection (D) of the party opponent hearsay
exemption. 102 With enough creativity, one can come up with a
hypothetical scenario where the defendant's employee or agent utters
a testimonial statement admissible under this rule, but again the
universe of such statements (that are valuable to the prosecution)
seems too small to be significant.
The last party opponent exemption, subsection (E), covers
coconspirator statements. 103 This rule generates a wealth of
prosecution evidence, but hearsay statements admitted under the
exception will almost never be testimonial. 104 The rule requires that
99. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Evidence Rules that Convict the Innocent, 106
CORNELL L. REv. 305, 307-11, 321, 330-31, 334-35, 338-39 (2021) (highlighting
historical resistance to hearsay confessions and the largely forgotten evidence policy
reasons that justified this resistance).
100. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
101. Id. at 801(d)(2)(C).
102. Id. at 801(d)(2)(D).
103. Id. at 801(d)(2)(E).
104. See infra Part III.B.2.
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qualifying statements be made "during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy." 105 Outside of a John Grisham novel, it is hard to conceive
of statements meeting this description that would fit the Court's
purpose
definition of testimonial: statements made "with the 'primary
106
of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."'
D. Rule 803 Exceptions
Rule 803 contains twenty-three hearsay exceptions. 107 These
exceptions can be invoked "regardless of whether the declarant is
available as a witness." 108 The first four hearsay exceptions in the
rule-present sense impressions, 109 excited utterances, 110 state of
mind,11 1 and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment 11 2 -

typically concern contemporaneous expressions of

feelings or observations. Statements admitted under these exceptions
are unlikely to be testimonial in light of the disconnect between the
contemporaneity requirements and the Court's narrow definition of
testimonial described in Part I.113
Some statements admitted under the excited utterance exception
may be testimonial, however, particularly in jurisdictions where
courts stretch that exception to allow well-after-the-excitingoccurrence statements. 114 In fact, one of the post-Crawford cases
where the Supreme Court found a confrontation violation, Hammon
v. Indiana, involved the excited utterance exception. 115 But the
application of that exception to the facts of Hammon illustrates the
disconnect. 116 The statements in Hammon were taken by police "some
105. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
106. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 250-51 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562
U.S. 344, 358 (2011)).
107. FED. R. EVID. 803.

108.

Id.

109. Id. at 803(1).
110. Id. at 803(2).
111. Id. at 803(3).
112. Id. at 803(4).
113. See supra Part I. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) also admits statements describing past
(i.e., non-contemporaneous) events if made for purposes of medical treatment or
diagnosis, rendering them nontestimonial on the grounds discussed in the subsequent
discussion.
114. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817-19, 828-29 (2006). The exception
permits: "A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused." FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
115. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819-20, 829-30 (Hammon v. Indiana was consolidated
with Davis v. Washington).
116. See id. at 830.
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time after the events described were over"; the emergency had passed
and the victim "deliberately recounted, in response to police
questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and
progressed." 117 Of course, the application of Indiana evidence law was
not before the Court. The statements were testimonial and, thus,
prohibited by the Confrontation Clause. 118 This pattern can be
expected to repeat, but only in circumstances like Hammon, where
courts apply the excited utterance exception to statements on the
exception's outer margins. In fact, in Bryant the Supreme Court
suggested that few excited utterances will be testimonial.11 9 There,
the Court explained that post-Crawford case law suggesting that a
statement is nontestimonial when uttered in response to an
emergency "is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance
exception in hearsay law."1 20 The Court went on to deem the
statements admitted as excited utterances in Michigan v. Bryant
nontestimonial despite a context similar to Hammon: controlled police
questioning that elicited statements of obvious value to a later
prosecution. 12 1 The lower courts have picked up on this analysis,
making blanket statements like: "We have held that 911 calls are
admissible as nontestimonial statements when they are 'excited
utterances."'

122

Further into Rule 803, Confrontation Clause violations become
even less likely. Statements admitted as recorded recollections1 23 will
not violate the Confrontation Clause because that exception requires
the declarant to testify. 124 The ten exceptions in the middle of Rule

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119.
120.

See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361-62 (2011).
Id.
Statements "relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition," are considered reliable because the declarant,
in the excitement, presumably cannot form a falsehood. An ongoing
emergency has a similar effect of focusing an individual's attention
on responding to the emergency.

Id. (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 349-50, 377-78.
122. United States v. Robertson, 948 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2020).
123. FED. R. Evm. 803(5).
124. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6853, at 338-39 (2017) ("Declarant Must
Testify"); see supra Part II.B.
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803,125 covering records of business, family, religious and
governmental organizations, will typically be nontestimonial because
the exceptions apply to statements generated for specific purposes,
none of which includes the purpose of creating a substitute for trial
testimony.1 26 In fact, courts interpret the business records hearsay
exception to include an implicit requirement that qualifying
documents must not be created for purposes of litigation. 127
Public records, by contrast, can be generated for purposes of
litigation.1 28 For example, a government chemist's analysis of an illicit
narcotic would certainly be testimonial. 129 But the public records
hearsay exception does not permit records memorializing the
observations of "law-enforcement personnel" to be introduced in a
criminal case. 30 Thus, the very types of public records that would
most likely violate the Confrontation Clause are not admissible under
the public records hearsay exception.1 3 1
The exceptions that-come at the end of Rule 803 are rarely invoked
and will almost never generate testimonial statements. Ancient
documents1 32 typically predate any controversy and so will not be
testimonial. Similarly, it is hard to imagine examples where market
35
reports,1 33 learned treatises,1 34 various types of court judgements,1
136
could be testimonial.
and reputation evidence
E. Rule 804 Exceptions
Rule 804 collects another five hearsay exceptions.1 37 Each of the
exceptions requires that the declarant be unavailable to testify.1 38
Consequently, if the prosecutor invokes these exceptions, out-of-court
statements will, by definition, be introduced against the defendant

125. FED. R. EvID. 803(6)-(15).
126. See id.
127. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6865, at 357-58 (2017) ("Anticipation of
Litigation").
128. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 322-24 (2009).
129. See id. at 323 n.9.
130. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii); WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6885, at 38485.
131. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii).
132. Id. at 803(16).
133. Id. at 803(17).
134. Id. at 803(18).
135. Id. at 803(22)-(23).
136. Id. at 803(19)-(21).
137. Id. at 804.
138. Id. at 804(b).
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without the declarant testifying at trial. 139 Still, only one of the Rule
804 exceptions appears likely to permit statements that could violate
the Confrontation Clause as it is currently interpreted. 1
The Rule 804 exception for former testimony will always permit
the introduction of "testimonial" hearsay. 14 1 The exception requires,
however, that the person against whom the hearsay is introduced had
a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.1 42 As far back
as Mattox, the Supreme Court established that this was sufficient to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause.143 The Court reiterated this notion
in Crawford, stating: "[T]he Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear
at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."144 As the former
testimony exception in Rule 804 requires precisely these conditions,
statements that qualify for admission under the rule will not violate
the Confrontation Clause. 145
The next Rule 804 exception, for dying declarations, is one of two
hearsay exceptions the Supreme Court singled out in Crawford as
potentially consistent with the Confrontation Clause "on historical
grounds." 146 Later in Giles v. California, the Supreme Court again
suggested that it would recognize a confrontation exception for
"declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death
and aware that he was dying." 147 This sounds like the familiar dying
declaration hearsay exception found in Rule 804; in fact, it is slightly
broader than that exception. 148 While it is possible that courts will

139. As one of the forms of unavailability is memory loss, see FED. R. EVID.
804(a)(3), there is a possibility for the declarant to testify in unusual cases and
nevertheless be deemed unavailable under this rule. In those circumstances, a
Confrontation Clause challenge would likely be unsuccessful due to the declarant's
presence at the trial. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 159, 162 (1970); supra Part

II.B.
140. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 804(b)(1)(B) ("[I]s now offered against a party who had . . . an
opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect
examination").
143. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1895).
144. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
145. See id. at 54.
146. Id. at 56 n.6.
147. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008).
148. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(2) ("In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case,
a statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant's death to be imminent,
made about its cause or circumstances.").
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sketch distinct contours for the dying declaration confrontation
exception, for now the courts appear to be treating the hearsay and
confrontation variants identically. 149 Consequently, out-of-court
statements admissible under a dying declaration hearsay exception
will rarely (if ever) violate the Confrontation Clause.
Rule 804 includes an exception for certain statements of a person's
family history. It is difficult to imagine statements offered under this
exception, to prove things like a person's "ancestry," 150 playing a
significant role in a criminal case. To the extent such statements are
relevant to a criminal prosecution they will also typically be
nontestimonial. 151
This brings us to the exception most likely to capture statements
whose admission would violate the Confrontation Clause: statements
against interest. 152 This exception arises most frequently when a
defendant commits an offense with the assistance of another
person. 153 In those circumstances, the accomplice may later make a
statement admitting guilt that also references the defendant. When
the accomplice later refuses to testify or is otherwise unavailable, the
prosecution can seek to introduce their out-of-court statement as a
statement against interest.1 54 The prosecutor will cite the portion of
the rule that permits a hearsay statement of an unavailable declarant
if the statement has "so great a tendency to . .. expose the declarant
to ... criminal liability" that "[a] reasonable person in the declarant's
position would have made it only if the person believed it to be
true[.]"155
The case law contains two common species of against-interest
statements.1 56 The first involves statements by an accomplice to police
.interrogators. Such statements are likely to be deemed testimonial
and so inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the
declarant testifies. In fact, the prosecution invoked the statementagainst-interest exception at trial in Crawford and the Supreme
149. See WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6704, at 27-28 (making a similar
point).
150. FED. R. EvmD. 804(b)(4).
151. See id. at 804(b)(4)(A) (excepting certain statements about a person's "birth,
adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, relationship by blood, adoption, or
marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history").
152. Id. at 804(b)(3).
153. See WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6995, at 557.
154. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
155. Id. at 804(b)(3)(A).
156. See WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6996, at 559 ("The case law divides
fairly evenly between against-interest statements made to confidantes and againstinterest statements made to police.").

2021]

MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

91

Court later ruled that the statement's admission violated the
Confrontation Clause.1 57 We would expect this pattern to repeat in the
case law. The hearsay rule's requirements should work in concert with
the "testimonial" definition to render the exception virtually useless
to the prosecution. Either a statement will be uttered in a context
where it is likely to be used as prosecution evidence, rendering it a
interest but barred by the
valid statement-against-penal
Confrontation Clause because testimonial, or it will be uttered in a
context where prosecution is unlikely, making it potentially
nontestimonial but insufficiently against interest to qualify for
admission under the hearsay exception.1 58
The second common species of statements against interest,
however, may not trigger Confrontation Clause violations. Often
prosecutors seek to introduce against-interest statements made by a
defendant's accomplice to friends, acquaintances, or family
members.1 59 Many of these statements should not be admitted under
the hearsay exception. In light of the friendly audience, such
statements are, "when spoken, fairly unlikely from the declarant's
perspective to be used in litigation."1 60 Nevertheless, courts often
admit these statements through the hearsay exception for statements
against penal interest. 161 When this happens, the Confrontation
Clause presents much less of an obstacle. As one of the authors has
explained elsewhere, the two-step analytical process unfolds as
follows:
Courts deem a statement made to a confidante (or a
spouse) to be against the declarant's interest due to the
statement's theoretical potential to expose the
declarant to criminal liability. The courts then pivot to
say that the statement is admissible without
confrontation because a statement "made to a
confidential informant," etc., "is not 'testimonial' for
Confrontation Clause purposes."' This two-step is
157. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40, 68-69 (2004) ("[T]he State invoked
the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.").
158. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 7000, at 577 ("Potential against-penalinterest statements will either not be sufficiently likely to result in prosecution to
qualify for admission under [the hearsay exception] or will be so likely to trigger
prosecution that they will be 'testimonial' and thus inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause.").

159.
160.
161.

Id. § 6996, at 559-60.
Id. § 7000, at 577.
Id. § 6996, at 562.
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almost farcical. It is, in essence, a ruling that: (1) the
statement survives a hearsay objection because the
speaker would have contemplated its potential use as
evidence at a later trial; and (2) the statement survives
a Confrontation Clause objection because the speaker
would not contemplate its use as evidence at a later
trial. 1 62
The two types of against interest statements generate distinct
Confrontation Clause analysis. We can expect Confrontation Clause
violations resulting from the admission of statements against interest
that arise during police questioning. We do not expect to find
Confrontation Clause' violations arising from against-interest
statements made to a non-police audience.
The final Rule 804 exception, the exception for forfeiture by
wrongdoing,163 is the second historical exception the Supreme Court
has identified to the confrontation right. The exception received
sustained scrutiny in Giles v. California.64 There, "the Supreme
Court reviewed the early history of American evidence law and
interpreted the resulting constitutional doctrine in a manner that
parallels the federal hearsay exception for forfeiture by
wrongdoing."1 65 The Court noted that it had previously described the
federal hearsay exception "as a rule 'which codifies the forfeiture
doctrine"'-tying the hearsay rule to the historical roots that drive its
current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.1 66 In light of these
parallels, it is likely that courts will interpret the two doctrines in
concert. This means that statements admitted under a forfeiture by
wrongdoing hearsay exception will also be permitted by the
Confrontation Clause.

162. Id. § 7000, at 577-78 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Pelletier,
666 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding the declarant's confession to a fellow jail inmate
about a drug smuggling crime sufficiently against interest to qualify for admission
because he "implicated himself in [a] conspiracy" but not testimonial because made "to
a fellow inmate with a shared history, under circumstances that did not portend their

use at trial").
163.

See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(6).

164.
165.

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367 (2008).
WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6704, at 27.

166. Giles, 554 U.S. at 367 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833
(2006)).
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F. The Residual Exception
The other common hearsay exception that may generate
Confrontation Clause violations is the residual exception. Federal
Rule of Evidence 807 permits hearsay statements that are reliable
and necessary, triggering a limitless array of potential scenarios. 167
That said, key legislative history regarding the exception signals a
limited role. 168 In enacting the exception, the Senate Judiciary
Committee explained: "It is intended that the residual hearsay
exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional
circumstances." 169 Courts regularly rely on this legislative history
and, "for the most part, internalize its spirit."1 7 0 Consequently, while
the residual exception has the potential to admit all manner of
statements, including some that would violate the Confrontation
Clause, we do not expect to find frequent instances in the case law.
G. Other Routes of Admissibility
There are a few other narrow pathways for the admission of outof-court statements that could result in a Confrontation Clause
violation. First, while States have largely adopted traditional hearsay
frameworks modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence,171 some
jurisdictions adopt eclectic hearsay exceptions that permit additional
evidence. This was the scenario that gave rise to both Ohio v. Clark172
and Giles v. California173 where unusual state evidence rules
permitted unconfronted statements to be introduced against a
criminal defendant. To the extent such hearsay is testimonial, as in
Giles174 but not Clark,175 the defendant's confrontation rights are
167. FED. R. EVm. 807. The rule was recently amended, although the substance
was left intact. See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee notes to 2019 amendment.
168. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20 (1974).
169. Id.
170. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 7061, at 645.
171. See sources cited supra note 85.
172. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 242 (2015) (noting the admission of the
statements at issue "under Ohio Rule of Evidence 807, which allows the admission of
reliable hearsay by child abuse victims").
173. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 357 (2008) (noting the admission of the
statements at issue "under a provision of California law [CAL. EVID. CODE §1370] that
permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or threat of
physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and
the prior statements are deemed trustworthy").
174. Id. at 358.
175. Clark, 576 U.S. at 242.
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threatened. Second, trial courts can incorrectly interpret the
traditional hearsay rules discussed in the preceding sections,
admitting out-of-court statements that should have been excluded.
As the survey results reported in the next Part show, the second
route referenced above leads to an important, and almost completely
overlooked, role for the Confrontation Clause. Hearsay is complicated.
One of the underappreciated ways out-of-court statements come
before a jury is that trial courts erroneously interpret the hearsay
rules to admit statements that should have been excluded. One
important area where this occurs is when courts admit hearsay
statements to assist the jury in evaluating an expert's testimony. 176
This was the scenario that led to Williams v. Illinois, a 2012
Confrontation Clause case that caused the Supreme Court Justices to
splinter without any majority opinion. 177 In that case, an Illinois trial
court permitted a forensic specialist, Sandra Lambatos, to testify that
a DNA sample obtained from the defendant, Sandy Williams, matched
a semen sample obtained from a rape victim. 178 The problem was that
a critical fact embedded in Lambatos' testimony-that the DNA
profile that Lambatos ran through a computer database was derived
from the rapist's semen-was hearsay. Lambatos learned that fact
from another analyst who did not testify. 179 Recognizing the hearsay
problem, the state prosecutor offered the evidence not for the truth of
the matter asserted but only to allow the jury to evaluate the expert
(Lambatos') testimony about the match. 180 Justice Alito, writing for a
plurality of the Court, focused on this distinction in concluding that
there was no Confrontation Clause violation.181
Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, disagreed. She explained,
"[F]ive Justices agree, in two opinions reciting the same reasons, that
this argument has no merit: Lambatos's statements about Cellmark's
report went to its truth, and the State could not rely on her status as
18 2
an expert to circumvent the Confrontation Clause's requirements."

176.

See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 50 (2012).

177.
178.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 60-61.

179. Id.
180. See id. at 63 ("Invoking Illinois Rule of Evidence 703, the prosecutor argued
that an expert is allowed to disclose the facts on which the expert's opinion is based
even if the expert is not competent to testify to those underlying facts." (footnote
omitted)).

181.

See id. at 78-79.

182.

Id. at 126 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kagan appears to get the better of this debate.1 83 The fact that
the DNA sample being analyzed came from the rapist was central to
the relevance of Lambatos's testimony. Some statement to that effect
had to be introduced for its truth, otherwise none of the testimony
about a "match" mattered at all. Consequently, scenarios like
Williams v. Illinois are another place to expect continuing
Confrontation Clause controversy and violations. 184
A second area where trial courts tend to erroneously admit
hearsay involves statements offered to explain the course of conduct
of investigating police officers. "Prosecutors frequently attempt to
introduce out-of-court statements, like informant tips, to illustrate
why the police took the investigative steps that led them to focus on a
suspect or discover evidence."1 85 As explained elsewhere, "[c]ourts
could rely on this theory of admissibility to admit all manner of
damning out-of-court hearsay allegations from absent and even
anonymous declarants for the non-hearsay purpose of illustrating a
police officer's course of action." 186 As courts have noted: "Allowing
agents to narrate the course of their investigations, and thus spread
before juries damning information that is not subject to crossexamination, would go far toward abrogating the defendant's rights
under the sixth amendment and the hearsay rule."1 87
In sum, the analysis in Part II reveals surprisingly few places
where the proper application of the standard American hearsay
framework should result in the admission of out-of-court statements
that violate the modern Confrontation Clause.1 88 As noted above, the
only compelling example of this phenomenon arises with a subset of
"statements against interest." Other potential scenarios for
Confrontation Clause violations involve statements offered under the
183. The reason this argument appeared in a dissent was that Justice Thomas
who agreed with Justice Kagan on this point nevertheless viewed the evidence as
nontestimonial based on his longstanding view that the Confrontation Clause only
applies to evidence with an even higher degree of formality than the Court's current
doctrine requires. See id. at 103-04 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184. Cf. Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from denial of certiorari in a case along these lines).
185. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6720, at 55.
186. Id. § 6720, at 56.
187. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004); see also United
States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 914, 927 n.14 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that courts "have
raised serious concerns with overview witnesses, particularly when presented at the
beginning of trial before the evidence summarized has been presented"); United States
v. Mazza, 792 F.2d 1210, 1215 (1st Cir. 1986) (criticizing evidence offered as
background to explain actions taken by government).
188. See supra Part II.
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residual exception, idiosyncratic state hearsay exceptions, or at the
margins of established hearsay exceptions. Finally, there is the
possibility that statements erroneously admitted under state and
federal hearsay rules will violate the Confrontation Clause. When
appellate courts review these rulings, they may identify a violation of
the Confrontation Clause alongside (or without considering) the
underlying hearsay violation. At least, that's the theory. The next
Part describes our effort to compare our theoretical analysis with
reality.189
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We conducted a comprehensive survey of lower court cases to test
our hypothesis (described in Part II) that overlap between existing
hearsay rules and modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would
result in a relative absence of Confrontation Clause violations. As
explained below, the survey results generally align with our
predictions but also reveal a few illuminating surprises.

A. Methodology
We searched for opinions issued after the Supreme Court's last
Confrontation Clause decision, Ohio v. Clark,190 containing the phrase
"Confrontation Clause." This phrase is the dominant label attached to
challenges based on the Sixth Amendment right of the accused "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." For example,
"Confrontation Clause" appears in the majority and dissenting.
opinion in Crawford thirty-one times, while "right to confrontation"
19
appears three times and "confrontation right" appears only once. 1
This pattern continued into the most recent Supreme Court case, with
the phrase "Confrontation Clause" appearing thirty-eight times in
Ohio v. Clark; "right to confrontation" appears twice and
"confrontation right" does not appear.1 92
Ohio v. Clark, decided on June 18, 2015, is the last time the
Supreme Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause, allowing a
significant body of case law to build up in the lower courts applying
the Court's guidance.1 93 We searched for cases decided after June 2015

189.

See infra Part III.

190.
191.
192.

Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
See Clark, 576 U.S. 237.

193.

See id.
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through the end of 2020, generating a database of just over five years'
worth of lower court applications of stable Supreme Court precedent.
To try to capture all the relevant cases, we searched both Westlaw
and LexisNexis. We included all decisions meeting our search criteria,
both published and unpublished, from the federal courts of appeals.
This provided our largest set of cases. We used the same search to find
all published decisions issued by the federal district courts. We also
analyzed a sample of unpublished federal district court opinions. The
sample was necessary because there were more than 7,000
unpublished decisions that met our broad criteria. We arbitrarily
selected two calendar months, February and July, and included every
unpublished opinion available on Westlaw and LexisNexis that raised
a Confrontation Clause claim in relation to hearsay evidence from
those months throughout our date range.
The Confrontation Clause applies to proceedings in both federal
and state courts.1 94 Although our federal case sample included many
reviews of state trials challenged in collateral proceedings, we also
sought to expand our survey to the state courts themselves. We chose
Texas, extending our survey to cases from the Texas Criminal Court
of Appeals and the Texas Court of Appeals. We used the same broad
search, looking for published cases on both Westlaw and LexisNexis
that mentioned the phrase "Confrontation Clause," decided after June
2015.
Because our search inquiry (Confrontation Clause) was so broad,
many of the cases we found were not of interest for our study. Our
focus was on the admission of out-of-court statements at trial.
Consequently, we excluded cases that did not concern that topic, but
resolved other less-commonly-litigated aspects of Confrontation
Clause doctrine, such as limitations on cross-examination of testifying
witnesses, 195 or challenges to testimony from anonymous witnesses,

196

or the numerous cases where courts summarily rejected confrontation
claims as inapplicable because the challenge occurred at
sentencing,1 97 or proceedings for revocation of supervised release,1 98

194. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Noel, 905 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2018).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (D.N.M. 2015).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Vera, 893 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2018) ("At
sentencing, the Confrontation Clause does not apply[.]").
198. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 852 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2017)
("[U]nder settled precedent the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does
not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings[.]").
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or pretrial detention, 199 or were otherwise procedurally barred. We
excluded many more cases, particularly those generated by the Lexis
search, because they simply referenced the Confrontation Clause in a
generic fashion without considering any claims that the Clause itself
was violated. 200
We also excluded all cases involving only so-called "Bruton
challenges." 201 Prior to 1968, in joint trials involving a confession that
was admissible against one co-defendant but not another, courts
sometimes admitted the confession and instructed the jury to consider
it only as evidence against the confessing co-defendant. 202 In Bruton
v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected that practice for
confessions that directly implicate both defendants. 203 Cases continue
to arise involving the degree of redaction necessary in a Bruton
situation, but these cases do not shed direct light on the questions
explored in this Article. 204 The hearsay exception invoked is always
the same-the statements are offered by the prosecution as
statements of the opposing party (the co-defendant). For Bruton
violations, no hearsay exception is involved for the non-confessing
defendant. By definition, evidence that violates Bruton is
inadmissible against the complaining party. 2 05 In addition, there is
confusion among the circuits as to how the Crawford framework
206
applies to confessions of a non-testifying codefendant-if at all. The
evolution of Bruton doctrine suggests that it may no longer be a

199. See United States v. Castanon-Perez, 347 F. Supp. 3d 661, 665 (D.N.M. 2018)
(stating that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to a pre-trial decision hearing).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 690 F. App'x 457, 458 (8th Cir. 2017)
(including the following at the end of a string cite: "United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d
1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2011) (review of Confrontation Clause objections)").
201. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
202. See id.
203. Id. at 137.
204. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 188 (1998); Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200 (1987).
205. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123.
206. Compare Lucero v. Holland, 902 F.3d 979, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2018) (collecting
cases from circuit that have extended the Crawfordframework to Bruton), with United
States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging that the Eleventh
Circuit has "yet to hold in a published opinion that Bruton applies only to testimonial
statements"), and United States v. DeLeon, 287 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1248 (D.N.M. 2018)
("The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington undermines Bruton v.
United States, because that decision indicates that introducing a non-testifying
defendant's confession and using that confession against a codefendant does not offend
the Confrontation Clause so long as the confession is nontestimonial.").
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Confrontation Clause issue, but more of a due process concern. 207 All
of this would make for interesting exploration but is a topic for a
different article.
Despite our effort to cast a wide net, it is important to note some
things our survey would miss. We did not capture confrontation
rulings that were neither appealed nor memorialized in a written
opinion. We simply could not come up with any practical way to
capture things like oral rulings excluding statements on confrontation
grounds. Our survey also did not capture evidence that was never
offered (or cases never charged) because prosecutors anticipated an
adverse ruling on admissibility. There is no reason to believe that our
sample is skewed by these omissions. But, as discussed below, blind
spots like these, which arise in any survey of written court decisions,
must be considered when evaluating our results. 208
Our findings are discussed in the sections that follow and
memorialized in charts appended to this Article. As previously
mentioned, our searches were over-inclusive; thus, the first step in
gathering the results was to eliminate cases that did not involve the
admissibility of out-of-court statements. 209 The charts included in the
appendix reflect categorization of all the remaining cases. The charts
identify the path to admission of the challenged out-of-court
statement, for example the specific hearsay exception invoked by the
prosecution and accepted by the trial court. 210 This information was
typically referenced in the opinion, but sometimes required further
research into the briefs or even transcripts of underlying proceedings.
In a few cases, we were unable to determine from the available
materials how a hearsay statement was admitted at trial. The chart
goes on to reflect whether the reviewing court deemed the hearsay
statements testimonial or non-testimonial; the court's Confrontation
Clause ruling; and the ultimate disposition of the case.

207. See generally Alfredo Garcia, The Winding Path of Bruton v. United States:
A Case of Doctrinal Inconsistency, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401, 402 (1988) (arguing that
Bruton's protections were eroding long before Crawford).
208. As noted, we searched for opinions using the two most prominent sources.
Opinions not captured by Lexis or Westlaw were not included. See Merrit McAlister,
Missing Decisions, 169 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 1101, 1139 (2021) (noting that Westlaw
and Lexis do not include some unpublished decisions on merits terminations). Again,
there is no reason to think that these omissions bias our sample.
209. See supra Part IIIA (giving examples of the cases excluded from the survey).
210. Some cases involve challenges to state convictions. For these cases, the
challenged evidence rules are often the state counterparts to the federal rules. For
simplicity's sake, this article frames its discussion through the lens of federal rules
because state rules generally track those rules.
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B. Findings
The next sections discuss the patterns detected in our empirical
survey of federal and state cases. Although we were most interested
in successful Confrontation Clause challenges, we also discuss the
most frequent challenges (even if unsuccessful) to illustrate the type
of out-of-court statements prosecutors rely on in criminal cases. In our
survey covering 437 cases, courts found 33 Confrontation Clause
violations. Thus, the courts found a Confrontation Clause violation in
about 8% of the cases where defendants raised the claim. In 48 cases,
the courts declined to rule on the Confrontation Clause challenge
because, in the courts' view, any error was "harmless," i.e., its effect
on the outcome was not sufficient to warrant reversal. In the
discussion that follows, we break down the challenges and outcomes
by the type of courts although the patterns were largely the same
throughout the three (federal appeals courts, federal district courts,
and Texas courts) samples.
1. Overview
We begin our analysis with the federal appeals court opinions.
These opinions provided the greatest number of Confrontation Clause
challenges in our sample and the most thorough discussion of the
circumstances generating those challenges and their resolution.
Discussion of the district court and Texas cases follows, but that
analysis largely serves to demonstrate that the federal appeals court
decisions are not anomalous.
In the federal appeals courts, four hearsay exceptions generated
the most Confrontation Clause challenges: statements by co2 13
conspirators 2 11 (31); business records 2 12 (25); excited utterances
(15); and public records 214 (12). Consistent with our predictions in
Part II, there were only 7 cases since mid-2015 where a federal
appeals court found that an out-of-court statement admitted through
a hearsay rule violated the Confrontation Clause. 2 15 In a surprise,
211.
212.
213.

See FED. R. EvmD. 801(d)(2)(E).
See id. at 803(6).
See id. at 803(2).

214.

See id. at 803(8).

215. See United States v. Barber, 937 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2019); United States
v. Cruz-Ramirez, 782 F. App'x 531, 538-39 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Bates, 665
F. App'x 810, 815 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. London, 746 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th
Cir. 2018); United States v. Cerda-Ramirez, 730 F. App'x 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Gutierrez-Salinas, 640 F. App'x 690, 693 (9th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Esparza, 791 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015).
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four of the seven cases involved evidence admitted under the hearsay
exception for public records. 216 As explained below, however, all of the
cases where statements admitted through a hearsay exception were
found to have violated the Confrontation Clause involved flawed
hearsay analysis. 217
The survey of district courts reflected a similar pattern to the
circuit courts, with one important distinction: the district courts
seemed even less likely to find Confrontation Clause violations. Again,
the most frequent challenges arose to statements made by a coconspirator, 2 18 excited utterances, 2 19 and business records. 220 The
district courts did not find any Confrontation Clause violations for
statements admitted under these rules.
The Texas cases revealed a similar pattern, although with
different areas of emphasis. Texas hearsay rules are modeled on the

216. See Barber, 937 F.3d at 969; London, 746 F. App'x at 318; Cerda-Ramirez,
730 F. App'x at 452; Esparza, 791 F.3d at 1074.
217. See Barber, 937 F.3d at 969; Cruz-Ramirez, 782 F. App'x at 538-39; Bates,
665 F. App'x at 815; London, 746 F. App'x at 318; Cerda-Ramirez, 730 F. App'x at 452;
Gutierrez-Salinas,640 F. App'x at 693; Esparza, 791 F.3d at 1074.
218. United States v. Pirk, 284 F. Supp. 3d 398, 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); United
States v. Braden, 328 F. Supp. 3d 785, 788 (M.D. Tenn. 2018); United States v. DeLeon,
287 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1240-41 (D.N.M. 2018); Molina v. Frauenheim, No. 14-8686-R,
2018 WL 4223707, at *20-21 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2018); Taylor v. Berghuis, No. 1511687, 2018 WL 3428693, at *7 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2018); Runyon v. United States,
228 F. Supp. 3d 569, 626-27 (E.D. Va. 2017); Powell v. Mackie, No. 1:15-cv-549, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129771, at *21 (W.D. Mich. July 5, 2017); United States v. Nevatt,
No. 16-00150-01-cr-w-dgk, 2017 WL 507234, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2017); United
States v. Ford, 155 F. Supp. 3d 60, 68 (D.D.C. 2016).
219. See United States v. Colon-Perez, 412 F. Supp. 3d 123, 124 (D.P.R. 2019);
Bowens v. Allbaugh, No. CIV-17-61-R, 2019 WL 943415, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26,
2019); Frey v. Gilmore, No. 3:16-cv-2296, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121611, at *36-37
(M.D. Pa. July 19, 2019); Lucas v. Inch, No. 18-60383, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123523,
at *26 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2019); Chavis v. Nogan, No. 15-250, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32025, at *22 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2018); Porter v. Madden, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150370,
at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2017); Davis v. Napel, No. 2:14-cv-10019, 2016 WL 795860,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 29, 2016); West v. Foster, No. 2:10-cv-02086-JAD-GWF, 2016
WL 409998, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2016).
220. Fulgiam v. Kenneway, 364 F. Supp. 3d 93, 98 (D. Mass. 2019); United States
v. Al-Imam, 382 F. Supp. 3d 51, 52 (D.D.C. 2019); United States v. Abu Khatallah, 278
F. Supp. 3d 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 2017); United States v. Ganesh, No. 16-cr-00211-LHK, 2018
WL 905941, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018); United States v. Hunter, No. 15-19(1),
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23376, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2018); Sissac v. Montgomery,
No. 16-cv-2287-BAS, 2018 WL 3375110, at *11 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2018); United States
v. Garcia, No. 16-20837, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107357, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. July 11,

2017).
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federal rules. 2 2 1 The rule that led to the most Confrontation Clause
challenges in the Texas cases was the excited utterance exception. 222
Out of the 31 cases in our sample, the Texas courts found 4
Confrontation Clause violations, 3 of which involved statements
admitted under a hearsay exception. 223 As discussed below, the Texas
cases finding Confrontation Clause violations fit the federal pattern
of an aggressive, typically improper, use of a hearsay exception
leading to a Confrontation Clause violation.
One of the big surprises in our survey was the number of
Confrontation Clause challenges that arose from statements admitted
on the grounds that they were not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. In the federal appeals courts, a total of 103 challenges fit
this pattern, 10 of which resulted in a Confrontation Clause violation.
Among the district court opinions, both published and unpublished,
32 statements were admitted as not being offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, 2 of which led to Confrontation Clause violations.
The Texas courts also reviewed 3 Confrontation Clause challenges
based on statements admitted on the ground that they were offered
for something other than the truth of the matter asserted but found
no violations.
2. Co-Conspirator Statements
Consistent with the discussion in Part II, the federal appeals
courts reacted uniformly to challenges to out-of-court statements
admitted as co-conspirator statements. In 31 cases, the defendant
challenged the admission of a co-conspirator statement, and in all 31,
the appeals courts found no Confrontation Clause violation. The
analysis was typically short and conclusory. To be admitted under the
exception for coconspirator statements, a statement must be made
"during and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 224 It would be highly
unlikely that such a statement would be testimonial, i.e., made for the
purpose of providing an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. As
the courts repeatedly state, "co-conspirator statements are 'by their

221. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 801-806, with FED. R. EvID. 801-807.
222. TEX. R. EVID. 803(2).
223. See Gutierrez v. State, 516 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. App. 2017) (admitted under
TEX. R. EVID. 803(2)); Kou v. State, 536 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. App. 2017) (admitted
under TEX. R. EVID. 803(4)); Gerron v. State, 524 S.W.3d 308, 325 (Tex. App. 2016)

(admitted under TEX. R. EvID. 803(8)).
224.

See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
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nature, not testimonial,' and thus not subject to the Confrontation
Clause." 226
It is curious that defendants raised this argument so frequently in
light of the limited prospects for success. This may be a function of the
high frequency with which such statements are introduced at trial.
On appeal, defendants challenging the admissions of co-conspirator
statements likely argue that the statements were improperly
admitted under the hearsay exception and violated the Confrontation
Clause. 226 This would explain why we see so many Confrontation
Clause challenges to coconspirator statements, despite the
predictable lack of success of those arguments.
The federal district courts cases and the Texas cases reflected the
same pattern. Of the 11 district court cases that considered challenges
to co-conspirator's statements, none resulted in a violation; in one the
court made no determination, holding that any violation was
harmless error. 227 The opinions contain the same cursory analysis,
emphasizing that "co-conspirator statements in furtherance of the
conspiracy" are not testimonial and, therefore, do not implicate the
Confrontation Clause. 228 The Texas cases mirror, those of the federal
district courts. Neither of the two cases resulted in a violation. 229

.

225. United States v. Laureano-P6rez, 797 F.3d 45, 65 n.21 (1st Cir. 2015); see also
United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 256 (4th Cir. 2019) ("[A]ll the statements were
made in furtherance of that criminal conspiracy and were not intended to be used as
a substitute for trial testimony."); United States v. Mayfield, 909 F.3d 956, 962 (8th
Cir. 2018) ("[C]o-conspirators' statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy ... are
generally non-testimonial and, therefore, do not violate the Confrontation Clause.");
United States v. Torres, 742 F. App'x 244, 246 (9th Cir. 2018) ("The statement that
Torres was his co-conspirator's 'right-hand man,' was not testimonial but rather a
statement in furtherance of the conspiracy."); United States v. Davis, 687 F. App'x 75,
78 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that statements admitted under co-conspirator exception
did not violate Confrontation Clause); United States v. Onyenso, 615 F. App'x 734, 736
(3d Cir. 2015) ("Evidence constituting ... 'statements in furtherance of a conspiracy'
are 'by their nature ... not testimonial."').
226. See sources cited supra note 9 (discussing overlapping objection strategy).
227. See Iona v. Smith, No. 16-cv-2708, 2019 WL 549019, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,

2019).
228. United States v. Pirk, 284 F. Supp. 3d 398, 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); see also
United States v. Braden, 328 F. Supp. 3d 785, 789 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) ("By definition,
a conspirators' statements in furtherance of the conspiracy are not by their nature
testimonial[.]" (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); United States v.
Ford, 155 F. Supp. 3d 60, 68 (D.D.C. 2016) ("Statements satisfying the coconspirator
non-hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) may be admitted
against co-defendants without violating the Confrontation Clause." (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
229. See Crawford v. State, 595 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Tex. App. 2019).
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3. Excited Utterances
The excited utterances exception was the third most popular
exception in our sample of federal appellate case law, arising in 15
cases. A court found a Confrontation Clause violation in one of those
cases. 2 30 This is, again, consistent with the predictions in Part II.231
While excited utterances can, at the margin, generate testimonial
statements, the Supreme Court's recent narrowing of the
"testimonial" definition makes this unlikely. 232
One of the published district court opinions, United States v.
Colon-Perez, illustrates the overlap between the hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause. 233 There, the minor victim made statements to
police after her car was pulled over. 234 The defendant had just beaten
her, and she was covered in blood. 235 The victim said, "do not let them
kill me, they have a gun." 236 Such a statement is clearly admissible
under the excited utterance exception-it is generated by an exciting
event and concerns that event. 237 As a "cry for help[,]" as opposed to a
statement uttered to create a substitute for trial testimony, it was also
not testimonial. 2 38
The one federal case that found that a statement admitted as an
excited utterance did violate the Confrontation Clause fits a distinct
pattern that emerged from our study. The statement was not
admitted at the margins of the exception, its admission violated the
exception. In United States v. Cruz-Ramirez, an informant told police
about a shooting. 239 As the informant regularly provided information
to police, and the circumstances did not suggest any effort to seek
assistance, the court deemed it testimonial.2 40 The Ninth Circuit
added that given the absence of urgency on the part of the informant,
and the additional disqualifying fact that the informant lacked
230. See United States v. Cruz-Ramirez, 782 F. App'x 531, 539 (9th Cir. 2019)
(holding challenged statements violated the Confrontation Clause); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Mitchell, 726 F. App'x 498 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Clifford,
791 F.3d 884 (5th Cir. 2015).
231. See supra Part II.
232. Id.; see, e.g., Mitchell, 726 F. App'x at 502; United States v. Smith, 637 F.
App'x 708, 710 (4th Cir. 2016); Lisle v. Pierce, 832 F.3d 778, 781-83 (7th Cir. 2016);
Rabb v. Sherman, 646 F. App'x 564, 564 (9th Cir. 2016).
233. United States v. Colon-Perez, 412 F. Supp. 123, 125 (D.P.R. 2019).
234. Id. at 124.

235.

Id.

236.

Id.

237.

Id.

238.
239.
240.

Id. at 125-26.
See United States v. Cruz-Ramirez, 782 F. App'x 531, 539 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id.
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firsthand knowledge, 241 the statement should not have been admitted
as an excited utterance. 242
The excited utterance exception was the vehicle for admission in
5 Texas cases. 243 In 4 cases, the confrontation claim was rejected
through the straightforward analysis forecast in Part II. For example,
in Avant v. State, the declarant's statements were admissible as
excited utterances because she was "upset, crying, and scared" after
having been assaulted, 244 and the statements were not testimonial
because she was "scared and obviously distressed" and seeking help
for an ongoing emergency. 245 By contrast, in Gutierrez v. Texas, the
court found that the admission of an assault victim's statements to a
police officer and her mother's description of the offense on a 911 call
violated the Confrontation Clause. 246 The appeals court solely
analyzed the Confrontation Clause aspects of the ruling. Its
reasoning, however, applies to both the hearsay and constitutional
analysis. The court noted that,
"

"The evidence shows that both the 911 call and Emily's
statements to Deputy Deliphose were focused on what had
occurred in the past. without any expressed concern or
discussion of an ongoing emergency." 247

"

"No one expressed any concern that Appellant would return
and the focus of the discussions in the 911 call and Emily's
statements were on what had already happened as opposed to
what was happening or might happen in the near future." 24 8

"

"For the 911 call, the 911 operator asked for the make, model,
and color of Appellant's car, explaining she did not need the
license plate. Even so, Emily spent some time going through

241. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6802, at 273-74 ("[P]ersonal knowledge
constitutes an additional, unenumerated requirement for admissibility of hearsay
offered under Federal Rules of Evidence 803, 804 and 807.")
242. Cruz-Ramirez, 782 F. App'x at 539 ("Nor was Acosta's call an excited
utterance.").
243. See Villanueva v. State, 576 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. App. 2019) (no violation);
Gutierrez v. State, 516 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tex. App. 2017) (violation); Davlin v. State,
531 S.W.3d 765, 771 (Tex. App. 2016) (no violation); Avant v. State, 499 S.W.3d 123,
129-30 (Tex. App. 2016) (no violation).
244. Avant, 499 S.W.3d at 129.
245. Id.
246. Gutierrez, 516 S.W.3d at 599.
247. Id. at 598.
248. Id. at 599.
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pictures on her phone to find the license plate number and give
it to the operator." 249
Thus, the Gutierrez case mirrored Hammon, where the Supreme
Court found a Confrontation Clause violation based on evidence
admitted at the margin of the excited utterance exception-a victim
responding to police questioning about a crime well after an
emergency had passed. 25 0
4. Business and Public Records
In 25 cases in the federal appeals court sample, defendants made
Confrontation Clause challenges to statements admitted under the
business records hearsay exception. The courts found a Confrontation
Clause violation in one of these cases. 2 51 In 21 cases, the courts found
no violation of the Confrontation Clause. In the 3 remaining cases, the
courts deemed any error to be harmless without deciding whether
there was a Confrontation Clause violation. 25 2 The lopsided results
are consistent with the analysis in Part II. Courts interpret the
business records exception to require that qualifying records were
created for "the administration of the [business's] affairs and not for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial." 253 Thus, it
should be rare that a proper application of the business records
hearsay exception would result in the admission of a testimonial
statement.

Even finding one court decision that ruled that a business record's
admission violated the Confrontation Clause was surprising. The
answer to this conundrum is that the trial court erred in its hearsay
analysis. In United States v. Bates, the trial court admitted a series of
documents related to investigations of child pornography, "ruling that
they were regularly conducted records of law enforcement, and
therefore admissible under the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)
hearsay exception." 25 4 The appeals court correctly recognized that
249. Id. at 598-99.
250. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2006).
251. See United States v. Bates, 665 F. App'x 810, 815 (11th Cir. 2019).
252. See United States v. Grecco, 728 F. App'x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2018); United States
v. Killen, 729 F. App'x 703, 714 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Castro, 704 F. App'x
675, 676 (9th Cir. 2017). The harmless error cases involved the introduction of an
autopsy report, Kik records, and a custody receipt.
253. See United States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009)).
254. United States v. Bates, 665 F. App'x 810, 814 (11th Cir. 2019); see FED. R.

EvmD. 803(6).
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such records were both "impermissible hearsay as well as
testimonial[.]" 2 55 Law enforcement records are properly analyzed
under the public records hearsay exception, not the business records
exception. 2 56 As noted in Part II, an explicit provision in the public
records exception blocks the admission of law enforcement records in
criminal cases.
The district court cases also reflected frequent challenges to
business records. None led to a finding of a Confrontation Clause
violation. Again, the number of challenges is more surprising than the
lack of success. Challenged records included certifications of the
authenticity of telephone records, 257 foreign phone records, 25 8 and
Instagram records. 259 As predicted in Part II, courts found such
records nontestimonial and their admission not to violate the
Confrontation Clause. 260 This follows from the clear dichotomy in the
hearsay rules between public and business records. Records generated
to serve as evidence in a criminal trial, and thus potentially
"testimonial" evidence, will typically be public not business records. 261
The public records exception was the fourth most challenged rule
in the federal appeals court sample and the most divisive. Out of the
12 statements that were admitted under the rule, the federal appeals
255. Bates, 665 F. App'x at 814.
256. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6885, at 386 ("The Law Enforcement
Exception") ("[L]aw enforcement records disqualified from admission under that rule
cannot be admitted as 'business records' under Rule 803(6).").
257. United States v. Al-Imam, 382 F. Supp. 3d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2019) (collecting
cases from every circuit in which the court held that such certifications do not pose
Confrontation Clause problems). The federal business records exception permits the
foundation for the exception to be laid by a certificate rather than live testimony. FED.
R. EVID. 803(6)(D). Relying on a passage in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, "[t]he
appeals courts have so far rejected Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause challenges
to the certification procedure, even though the certification would appear to fall within
the Supreme Court's definition of 'testimonial.'" WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, §
6863, at 354-355. Although the Court has not clarified the point, this seems to be
another historical exception to the requirement that testimonial evidence must be
confronted. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 322-23 (noting that as a historical matter,
"[a] clerk could by affidavit authenticateor provide a copy of an otherwise admissible
record").
258. United States v. Khatallah, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2017).
259. United States v. Garcia, No. 16-20837, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107357, at *4
(S.D. Fla. July 11, 2017) ("[T]he Instagram records were not hearsay because they
were records of Garcia's regularly conducted business activity pursuant to Rule
803(6).").
260. Khatallah, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 11.
261. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supranote 30, § 6882, at 380 ("[R]ecords of a public agency
will typically not be considered for admission separately under Rule 803(6).").
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26 2
4 did
courts held that 7 did not violate the Confrontation Clause,
it
not
or
whether
violate the Clause, and 1 was harmless error
26 3
constituted a violation.
Finding cases where out-of-court statements admitted under the
public records exception violated the Confrontation Clause was a
surprise in light of our predictions in Part II. Only one type of public
record would seem to fit the definition of "testimonial"-records
generated for use as evidence in an adversarial proceeding. And those
records appear to be excluded either under the law enforcement
exception to the public records exception, or the rule's general
trustworthiness clause. 264 Consequently, we discuss these cases in
further detail below.
Three of the four cases where Confrontation Clause violations
stemmed from the admission of public records neatly fit the theme
that dominated our sample-a trial court error in interpreting the
hearsay rules. The fourth case also fits this pattern although the
question is closer. Each case is described below.
The most obvious error occurred in United States v. London, where
the prosecution introduced correspondence from banks that had been
265
The
robbed that stated that the banks were federally insured.
effect
and
their
at
trial,"
for
use
letters were "specifically prepared
"was to allow . . . an out-of-court witness not subject to cross26 6
examination, to testify via 'certificate' to an essential element[.]"
That violates the Confrontation Clause and the public records
hearsay exception. The letters were not "records of a public office" and
the statements they contained were not observations made "while
under a legal duty to report." 26 7 In United States v. Cerda-Ramirez,
the hearsay error was equally obvious; the district court admitted a
criminal complaint and accompanying affidavit under the public
records exception. On its way to finding a Confrontation Clause
violation, the Ninth Circuit observed that the documents "were
inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) [the public records hearsay

262. See United States v. Noria, 945 F.3d 847, 860 (5th Cir. 2019); United States
v. Lopez, 730 F. App'x 479, 480 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Fryberg, 854 F.3d
1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gonzalez, 658 F. App'x 867, 869 (9th Cir.
2016); United States v. Hughes, 840 F.3d 1368, 1383 (11th Cir. 2016); United States
v. de Jesus-Concepcion, 652 F. App'x 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2016).
263. See United States v. Barber, 937 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2019).
264. See FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(A)(ii); FED. R. Evie. 803(8)(B).
265. United States v. London, 746 F. App'x 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2018).

266.

Id. at 321-22.

267.

See FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii).
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exception]" since they were prepared by law enforcement officials in
an adversarial setting. 268

Similarly, in United States v. Barber,26 9 the Seventh Circuit
considered a series of documents generated by Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) agents, introduced to support a federal firearms
prosecution. 270 The court stressed that these documents went beyond
merely providing relevant copies of licensing records, but included
affidavits by ATF agents attesting to key facts in the case, such as
"the purpose of the records" and explaining how they served "as proof
that these are the records used for firearm licenses and that [a key
figure in the case] was licensed during the relevant period." 271
Although the court did not discuss the application of the hearsay rule,
again the court found a Confrontation Clause violation for reasons
that would parallel a conclusion that the public records exception did
not apply. 272 The challenged affidavits were prepared by law
enforcement officials in an adversarial setting and were consequently
ineligible for admission under both the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause. 273
The fourth public records example, United States v. Esparza, is
also best categorized as an error in hearsay analysis. 274 As the case
presents a novel hearsay question regarding "outsider statements" in

public records, a little background is required. Outsider statements in
the business records context are statements by someone not a part of
the business that are captured in the business' records. 275 Such
statements are not admissible through the business records
exception. 276 Because the public records exception is written to cover
statements by public officials ("record[s] . . . of a public office" that
include "matter[s] observed while under a legal duty to report"), 277 the
278
issue of outsider statements rarely arises.

268.
269.

United States v. Cerda-Ramirez, 730 F. App'x 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Barber, 937 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2019).

270.

Id. at 967-68.

271.
licensed
272.
273.
274.
275.
issue).

Id. at 968. The criminal charge was "stealing firearms from a federally
firearms dealer." Id. at 967.
Id. at 969.
Id.
See United States v. Esparza, 791 F.3d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015).
See United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing this

276.

Id. at 75.

277.

FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(A)(ii).

278.

See WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6888, at 398-401 (discussing outsider

statements in public records).
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Cases like Esparza raise the question of the proper treatment of
outsider statements in public records. While the hearsay analysis is
complex, the facts are straightforward. Police intercepted Arturo
Esparza as he drove across the border in a car "that had multiple
279
packages of marijuana hidden in the gas tank and dashboard." At
his trial, the prosecution introduced a Notice of Transfer/Release of
Liability (the Notice) signed by the registered owner of the car, Diana
Hernandez. The Notice stated that Hernandez sold the car to the
defendant six days before his arrest.2 80 Since Hernandez forwarded
this form to the Department of Motor Vehicles, the prosecutor offered,
and the trial court admitted, the Notice as a public record. 281 The
unusual circumstances that led to the creation of the Notice shed light
on the determination that the record's introduction violated the
Confrontation Clause. 282 These circumstances also suggest that the
Notice should not have been admitted under the public records
exception.
As the Ninth Circuit emphasized, "[p]rior to sending the Notice of
Transfer/Release of Liability to the DMV, Hernandez was notified by
CBP [Customs and Border Protection] that her car had been seized
because it was used to smuggle more than 50 kilograms of
marijuana."283 Hernandez promptly filed the Notice claiming the car,
was not hers. 284 Thus, the statements introduced were not those of a
public official, but rather a witness contacted by law enforcement
about a crime, who responded with a formal filing exonerating herself
and laying blame on the defendant:
Hernandez was not an agency employee who prepared
or maintained documents as part of her official duties.
Nor was she a private citizen who, in the course of a
routine sale, simply notified the DMV of the transfer of
her car. Instead, her car had already been seized for
serious criminal violations, and she sent the transfer
form to the DMV only after receiving a Notice of
Seizure from CBP.285

279.
280.
281.

Esparza, 791 F.3d at 1068.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1073.

282.
283.
284.

See id. at 1074-75.
Id. at 1073.
Id.

285.

Id. at 1073-74.
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While this makes it clear that the Notice was properly deemed
testimonial, it also suggests it was improperly admitted as a public
record. The evidentiary value of the Notice derived completely from
the statement of a private citizen, not a government official. Thus, like
an income tax return located in IRS files, it seems a poor fit for the
public records hearsay exception. 286 In addition, the hearsay exception
bars the admission of statements if "the source of information or other
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness." 287 The strong
incentive for the declarant in Esparza to lie about ownership of the
car provided an alternative, and equally compelling, basis to find that
the Notice did not qualify for admission under the public records
hearsay exception.

One of the few Texas cases finding a Confrontation Clause
violation also involved misuse of the public records exception. In
Gerron v. State, a trial court admitted a police officer's testimony
about the identities and ages of underage girls who appeared in
pornographic photographs possessed by the defendant. 288 The officer
learned this information by speaking to other investigators and
looking at various documents. 289 On appeal, the prosecution invoked
the public records hearsay exception on the tenuous basis that some
of those documents (which were not introduced) might have qualified
as public records. 290 The Texas Court of Appeals determined that the
admission of this testimony violated both the hearsay rules and the'
Confrontation Clause, although it went on to find the error to be
harmless. 2 9 1 Again, the Confrontation Clause violation paralleled a
clear violation of the hearsay rules.
5. Miscellaneous
Our sample also captured cases where defendants raised
Confrontation Clause challenges to statements offered under other
hearsay exceptions. Some cases involved predictably unsuccessful
challenges to evidence admitted under a hearsay exception that would
286. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6888, at 399 ("[T]he courts have resisted
the notion that a legal duty to file information with the government, such as the
obligation to file a tax return, renders the filed document a public record admissible
under Rule 803(8).").
287. FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(B).
288. Gerron v. State, 524 S.W.3d 308, 323 (Tex. App. 2016).
289. See id. at 323-324.

290.

Id. at 324.

291. Id. at 325 (noting that the evidence was "generally not admissible. See TEX.
R. Evm. 803(8)(B)").
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rarely implicate the Confrontation Clause. 292 But we also found
additional Confrontation Clause violations that arose from an
erroneous application of the hearsay rules. This fits the familiar
pattern: cases where a hearsay exception that would not be expected
to admit evidence that would violate the Confrontation Clause was
applied incorrectly, leading to a Confrontation Clause violation.
For example, in United States v. Gutierrez-Salinas, the district
court admitted a statement signed by the defendant as a statement of
a party opponent, leading to a successful Confrontation Clause
challenge on appeal. 29 3 Typically, such a challenge would make little
sense since the defendant has no right to confront himself. 294
However, in this case, law enforcement provided the defendant-who
spoke another language-with the statement to sign without
providing an interpreter who could explain the statement's contents
to the defendant. 295 Thus, the statement was not, in fact, the
defendant's statement, but a statement of a law enforcement official
chronicling what had occurred. 296 This made the statement
"inadmissible hearsay" since it was not, in fact, the party's own
statement. 297 That explains how a statement admitted under the
opposing party's statement hearsay exception could violate the
Confrontation Clause. 298 The trial court got the hearsay analysis
wrong.

Another Confrontation Clause violation arose in Kou v. State,
where the trial court erred in applying the hearsay exception for
statements made to obtain medical diagnosis and treatment.299 There,
a "Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner" who examined an assault victim
requested lab analysis regarding the victim's condition, and later
testified about the lab's findings during trial. The trial court allowed
the testimony about the lab's findings under the hearsay exception for
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis.3 00 At the time of the

292. See, e.g., Labon v. Martel, No. CV 14-6500-DSF, 2016 WL 8470181, at *11
(C.D. Cal. July 21, 2016) (attempting to use an absent witness's report to refresh a
witness's recollection).
293. United States v. Gutierrez-Salinas, 640 F. App'x 690, 693 (9th Cir. 2016).
294. See discussion supra Section II.C.
295. Gutierrez-Salinas, 640 F. App'x at 692.

296.
297.
298.

Id. at 693.
Id.
Id. at 692-93.

299. Kou v. State, 536 S.W.3d 535, 545 (Tex. App. 2017).
300. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(4) ("A statement that: (A) is made for-and is
reasonably pertinent to-medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical
history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general
cause.").
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nurse's examination, the victim "had already seen a doctor who had
rendered a diagnosis and prescribed medication" and "the record does
not show the lab test results were used for anything other than
prosecution."3 0 1 Consequently, the lab report was testimonial.30 2 For
the same reason-the report was obtained for prosecution not for
diagnosis or treatment-its admission also violated the hearsay
rules.30 3
In an unusually convoluted case, State v. Jensen, the Seventh
Circuit vacated a state court conviction where the trial court admitted
a letter from the deceased victim; the letter stated that if she died in
suspicious circumstances her husband was the culprit.3 0 4 The letter,
a solemn accusation intended to be delivered to the authorities upon
the victim's death, was testimonial.3 0 5 How it was admitted under
Wisconsin's hearsay rules is unclear.30 6 On appeal, the parties fought
over the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
Confrontation Clause.3 0 7 Wisconsin does not appear to have adopted
forfeiture as a hearsay exception, however.3 08 The briefing suggests
that the trial court admitted the letter as a dying declaration. 309 If so,
that was error, since the requisite unequivocal anticipation of
imminent death was not present.3 10 Thus, the familiar pattern
emerges again. The letter, later deemed to have violated the
Confrontation Clause, should never have been admitted under the
jurisdiction's hearsay rules. This was another instance of the
Confrontation Clause operating to correct an error in the application
of the hearsay rules.
Finally, our Texas sample provided an example of a Confrontation
Clause violation that stemmed from a local jurisdiction's unusual
hearsay exception. Interestingly, once again the Confrontation Clause
violation occurred, at least in part, because the exception was
301.

Kou, 536 S.W.3d at 545.

302.

Id.

303. TEX. R. EVID. 803(4) (qualifying statements must be "made for ...
diagnosis or treatment").
304. State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 528-29 (2007).

305.

See id.

306.

See id. at 537.

307.

See id.

medical

308. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.045 (West 2021) (collecting Rule 804 exceptions
but not including forfeiture exception typically included at Rule 804(b)(6)).
309. See Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant at 9, State v. Jensen, 727
N.W.2d 518 (2007) (No. 02-CF-314), 2009 WL 8596773, at *9.
310. Id.; Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, .100 (1933) (setting forth
traditional requirement for exception that "death is near at hand, and what is said
must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence").
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misapplied. Texas Criminal Code of Procedure Article 38.072 allows a
child complainant's statements to be introduced into evidence by the
first adult to whom the child described the offense. 3 11 In In re P.M.,
the lower court allowed hearsay evidence as contemplated in this rule
in a sexual assault case. 3 12 The rule requires, however, that the
prosecution call the child to testify or demonstrate that doing so would
harm the child. 313 The state did neither and so the evidence violated
both Texas' hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. 314
Other than In re P.M., we did not find examples of testimonial
statements being offered under unusual hearsay rules, such as ad hoc
rules crafted as a convenience for government officials. This follows
from the Supreme Court's post-Crawford scientific evidence cases,
where the Supreme Court made it clear that prosecutors could not
submit affidavits from government officials in lieu of their live
testimony. 315 We found no evidence that this type of evidence
continues to be offered against criminal defendants, suggesting a
significant effect of the modern Confrontation Clause- which we
discuss further in Part IV.316
6. Not for Truth
Our empirical survey uncovered a surprising number of
Confrontation Clause challenges (138), and violations (12), arising
from out-of-court statements introduced "not for the truth of the
matter asserted." 317 As explained in Part II, the hearsay prohibition
only bars out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.3 18 In addition, only statements offered for the truth
of the matter asserted can violate the Confrontation Clause. 3 19 The

311.

See In re P.M., 543 S.W.3d 365, 377 (Tex. App. 2018).

312.
313.

Id. at 379.
Id. at 380-81.

314. Id. at 381. Recall that if the declarant testifies there is no Confrontation
Clause violation. See discussion supra Section II.B. Consequently, only if the state
relied on the "welfare of the child" provision of the exception, could proper application
of this exception lead to a statement that violates the Confrontation Clause. In re P.M.,

543 S.W.3d at 380-81.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See discussion supra Part
See discussion supra Part
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
See discussion supra Part
See discussion supra Part

I.
IV.

II.
II.

2021]

MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

115

overlap between these two propositions should be total. 320 Thus, a
Confrontation Clause violation can only arise in this context when
there is a parallel hearsay violation. Yet these cases generated many
of the violations found by courts in our survey, supporting one of this
Article's primary themes. The Confrontation Clause, as currently
interpreted, serves an important and underappreciated role as a
backstop to errors in the trial court's application of nonconstitutional
hearsay rules.
The primary non-hearsay uses of challenged statements in our
survey fit three patterns: statements offered to impeach a testifying
witness, 321 statements offered to explain the basis for an expert's
opinion, 322 and statements offered to explain the course of an
investigation or some related background purpose. 323 The last of
these, statements offered to explain the course of the investigation,
was the most common scenario. It is also a well-established problem
area in federal hearsay case law.
320. In theory, the Supreme Court could fashion a constitutional "truth of the
matter asserted" definition based on historical sources that deviates from the modern
hearsay definition. James L. Kainen & Carrie A. Tendler, The Case for A
Constitutional Definition of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation of Testimonial,
Nonassertive Conduct and Statements Admitted to Explain an Unchallenged
Investigation, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 1415, 1417 (2010) ("Crawford requires a
constitutionally mandated definition of hearsay that reflects the full scope of the
confrontation right."). But until it does so, there is no sign that the lower courts will
do so on their own initiative.
321. See, e.g., United States v. John, 683 F. App'x 589, 594 (9th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Hill, 659 F. App'x 707, 712 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Cotton, 823 F.3d
430, 436 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Wong v. Kernan, No. 17-00520-RGK (FFM), 2019 WL
1865161, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2019); Subasic v. United States, No. 5:09-CR-216FL-3, 2018 WL 3631884, at *6 (E.D.N.C. July 31, 2018); Dickey v. Davis, 231 F. Supp.
3d 634, 711 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 825, 839 (4th Cir. 2019); United
States v. Lopez, 880 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Aguirra, 693 F.
App'x 516, 519 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501, 511-12 (5th
Cir. 2016); United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Bostick, 791 F.3d 127, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
323. See, e.g., United States v. Audette, 923 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Vo, 766 F. App'x 547, 549 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Barragan,
871 F.3d 689, 705 (9th Cir. 2017); Viavada v. McKee, No. 5:15-CV-12257, 2016 WL
393177, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2016); United States v. Onyenso, 615 F. App'x 734,
736 (3d Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Landa, No. 2:13-cr-00484-CAS,
2019 WL 653853, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019); United States v. Jones, 930 F.3d
366, 377 (5th Cir. 2019) ("[C]ourts must be vigilant in ensuring that these attempts to
'explain the officer's actions' do not allow the backdoor introduction of highly
inculpatory statements .... " (quoting United States v. Kizzee, 877 F.3d 650, 659 (5th
Cir. 2017)).
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While there is a technically valid non-hearsay purpose for
statements offered to explain the course of an investigation, there is
also "breathtaking potential for abuse." 324 Many cases that led to
reversals in our survey illustrate that problem. In United States v.
Jones, the government did not dispute that the challenged
statements, made by an informant to a police officer about the
defendant's guilt, could not be used to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. 325 It argued instead that the statements were introduced to
326
The Fifth Circuit
"explain the actions of law enforcement officers."
was not amused:

.

A witness's statement to police that the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged is highly likely to influence
the direction of a criminal investigation. But a police
officer cannot repeat such out-of-court accusations at
trial, even if helpful to explain why the defendant
became a suspect or how the officer was able to obtain
a search warrant. 327

328
As one of the authors
The court went on to reverse the conviction.
of this Article has explained in the context of the hearsay rules:
"Overreliance on out-of-court statements offered as background in
this context is not an isolated problem. Courts that are typically
reluctant to publicly criticize prosecutors have flagged the 'apparently
widespread abuse' of the 'background exception to the hearsay

rule."'329

This pattern repeated in another reversal, United States v.
Kizzee. 330 There, the prosecution introduced statements from an
accomplice who, while being interrogated by police, confirmed the
defendant's guilt. 33 1 The government claimed that it introduced the
statements, not for their truth, but rather to explain the basis for
obtaining a warrant and subsequent police conduct. 332 The appellate
324.
325.

WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30,
Jones, 930 F.3d at 377.

326.
327.

Id.

§ 6720, at 57.

Id.

328. Id.
329. WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 30, § 6720, at 60 (footnote omitted). Properly
used, this would not be an "exception" but an. application of the hearsay rule since
qualifying statements would not be offered for the truth of the matter asserted and so
wouldn't fall within the definition of hearsay.
330. United States v. Kizzee, 877 F.3d 650, 663 (5th Cir. 2017).

331.

Id. at 655.

332.

Id. at 659.
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court rejected this argument, noting that these statements were
"unquestionably testimonial hearsay." 333 The court explained that the
prosecution can only introduce out-of-court statements like this when,
as in the example offered in Part II.A, such context is relevant to a
disputed issue in the case (such as an allegation of harassment).334 In
Kizzee, there was no such claim. Consequently, the statements were
only relevant, and had been used, as an (improper) hearsay accusation
of the defendant's guilt. 335 The court reversed the conviction. This
pattern of appellate courts rejecting the admission of out-of-court
statements purportedly-but not actually-offered to explain the
course of the investigation arose with surprising frequency in our
sample. 336
McCarley v. Kelly illustrates a similar error, where the trial court
permitted the introduction of out-of-court statements, not for their
truth, but purportedly to explain the basis of an expert's opinion. 337
The Sixth Circuit held that the state court unreasonably applied
clearly established Sixth Amendment law when it allowed a child
psychologist to testify about statements made by a three-and-a-halfyear-old declarant. 338 While not apparent from the court's opinion, the
Appellee's brief noted that the state court admitted reports that
contained the child's statements because they were not being offered
333.

Id. at 656-57.

334. Id. at 659.
335. Id. at 660.
336. See Reiner v. Woods, 955 F.3d 549, 553 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting how the trial
court erroneously permitted statements of deceased pawn shop owner that defendant
attempted to pawn stolen merchandise, purportedly to explain officer's actions in going
to pawn shop); United States v. Tuttle, 837 F. App'x 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting
how statement elicited by officer on body camera video from defendant's companion
that an illicit weapon belonged to defendant, purportedly offered for completeness of
video footage); United States v. Benamor, 937 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting
how the trial court erred in admitting landlord's statement confirming defendant's
guilt ostensibly offered to "to show their effect on [Officer] Thompson, not for the truth
of the statements"); United States v. Vo, 766 F. App'x 547, 549 (9th Cir. 2019) ("The
government argues that the informant's statements were not provided for their truth,
but rather 'as context .... '); United States v. Marquez, 898 F.3d 1036, 1047-48 (10th
Cir. 2018) (accepting government's concession on appeal that statements elicited
apparently to confirm investigatory steps was improperly admitted); Richardson v.
Griffin, 866 F.3d 836, 840-41 (7th Cir. 2017) ("The state tried to justify the admission
of Azcona's report of what Holden and the unnamed witness said as an account of the
course of Azcona's investigation[.]"); cf. Kainen & Tendler, supra note 320, at 1419
("[C]ourts routinely admit such testimonial statements for this non-hearsay purpose
although the defendant did not question the investigators' actions.").
337. See McCarley v. Kelly, 801 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2015).
338. Id. at 665.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

118

[Vol. 89:67

for the "truth of the matters contained in the reports but only for the
fact that the reports were made." 339 As the federal court's review was
limited to constitutional questions, it concerned itself only with that
analysis, finding that the statements "were deliberately elicited in an
interrogation-like atmosphere" and thus testimonial. 340 But in
analyzing the violation for harmless error, the court noted that a key
aspect of the problem was that the statements were, in fact,
"introduced-without a limiting instruction-to establish the truth of
the matter asserted." 341 Thus, the court's conclusion that the
statements violated the Confrontation Clause once again paralleled a
conclusion that they were improperly admitted under the hearsay
rules. A similar error involving expert testimony occurred in Holland
v. Rivard, where a Michigan state court permitted an "expert witness
. . . to relate the work that two of her non-testifying colleagues
performed." 342 Again, this violated both the hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause. 343
In sum, all the violations discussed in this (not-for-the-truth-ofthe-matter-asserted) section involved a Confrontation Clause
violation that paralleled a hearsay rules violation. As noted at the
outset, when out-of-court statements are offered for something other
than the truth of the matter asserted they are both not hearsay and
do not violate the Confrontation Clause. When, as in a surprising
number of cases in our survey, the courts find a Confrontation Clause
violation in this context, it is because the statements were, in fact,
introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted and thus violated
the hearsay prohibition as well.
7. Harmless Error
Despite a large number of cases in our survey where courts held
that the admission of out-of-court statements violated the
Confrontation Clause, very few cases resulted in reversal. In our
survey covering 437 total cases, and 33 total Confrontation Clause
violations, only 8 cases ended with the court reversing a conviction: 4

339.
22562).
340.
341.

Brief of Appellee at 10, McCarley v. Kelly, 801 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2015) (No.
McCarley, 801 F.3d at 665.
Id. at 666.

342.

Holland v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 224, 232 (6th Cir. 2015).

343.

Id. at 232, 243.
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federal circuit court cases, 34 4 2 federal district court cases,34 5 and 2
Texas state court cases. 34 6 The reason for the discrepancy is the
principle of harmless error. Out of the 33 violations in our sample, the
courts concluded that 25 were harmless. This raises an important
doctrinal point about the distinction between a violation of the
hearsay rules and a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
Violations of the Confrontation Clause require stricter harmless
error review than errors in applying the nonconstitutional hearsay
rules. A violation of the hearsay rules is "evidentiary error," requiring
reversal only if "there is a reasonable likelihood that [the errors]
affected the defendant's substantial rights"; violations of the
Confrontation Clause are constitutional error, requiring reversal
unless "it is 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' 347 The
survey results suggest, however, that even the more stringent
harmless error standard for constitutional error does not produce
many reversals. This means that the influence of the Confrontation
Clause, at least on appeal, is blunted by frequent findings that
violations are harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt."
8. The Absence of Violations Involving Statements Against Interest
One of our most intriguing findings was the relative infrequency
of cases involving the statement against interest exception. To the
degree we expected to find Confrontation Clause violations in the

344. See United States v. Jones, 930 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2019); United States
v. London, 746 F. App'x 317, 323-24 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kizzee, 877 F.3d
650, 663 (5th Cir.. 2017); Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI, 861 F.3d 459, 473 (3d Cir.
2017); McCarley, 801 F.3d at 668.
345. See United States v. Ackerly, 395 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164, 167, 168 (D. Mass.
2019); Dixon v. Pfister, 420 F. Supp. 3d 740, 764, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
346. See In re P.M., 543 S.W.3d 365, 381, 383 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018); Gutierrez v.
State, 516 S.W.3d 593, 599-600 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017).
347. United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1229 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted). In addition, only constitutional errors are remediable in federal
collateral review of state court convictions. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220
(2011) ("The habeas statute 'unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a
writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' We have stated
many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not he for errors of state
law."'(citations omitted)); Brantley v. Harry, No. 2:17-cv-13634, 2019 WL 2247733, at
*7 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019) ("To the extent that Petitioner argues that the evidence
should not have been admitted under Michigan hearsay rules as a statement against
interest, his claim is not cognizable on habeas review.").
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post-2015 case law, we expected them to occur most frequently with
statements admitted under that exception. We found no such
violations.
The absence of Confrontation Clause violations generated by the
admission of against interest statements is partially explained by the
discussion in Part II.E. 348 Our survey did capture cases involving
confrontation challenges to the admission of statements against
interest, but these cases involved statements that arose in
conversations with friends and acquaintances. As noted in Part II.E,
such statements are generally not testimonial and so their admission
does not violate the Confrontation Clause. There is a real question
about whether such statements should be admitted under the
statement against interest exception. Statements to friends and
acquaintances are not usually viewed by the speaker as likely to
become prosecution evidence. Consequently, such statements are
rarely so powerfully against interest that they must be true-as the
hearsay exception requires. 349 But that would be an error in the
hearsay analysis, not the application of the Confrontation Clause. And
the Confrontation Clause does not backstop this type of hearsay error.
Two cases from our survey helpfully illustrate the phenomena
described above. In United States v. Taylor, the prosecution
introduced a statement by the defendant's accomplice to a jailhouse
informant that implicated both the accomplice and the defendant in a
murder. 35 0 The Second Circuit deemed the statements sufficiently
against interest to qualify for admission under the hearsay exception,
but determined that they were "not testimonial because [the
declarant] was not aware that he was speaking to a confidential
informant or that his statements could be used at a trial."3 51 Note that
if, in fact, the declarant did not anticipate "that his statements could
be used" against him by authorities, it is unclear that the statements
strongly-against-interest.
exception's
hearsay
the
satisfied
requirement. 352 But, again, this is a problem of hearsay law. The
Confrontation Clause analysis is sound.
United States v. Alvarado concerned a similar scenario. 353 In fact,
the defendant focused his arguments on this exact weakness, pointing
out that the out-of-court statement in which the declarant "admitted

348. See supra Part II.E.
349. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A); supra Part II.E.
350. See United States v. Taylor, 802 F. App'x 604, 608 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding
statement against interest to confidential informant not testimonial).
351. Id.
352. See supra Part II.E.
353. See United States v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242,.251 (4th Cir. 2016).
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to purchasing heroin [from the defendant] was 'nominally against [the
declarant's] penal interest'-although 'barely so' because [the
declarant] Thomas was speaking 'only to other drug users and
friends."' 354 The court skipped over that complication, taking on the
Confrontation Clause analysis instead. The court explained that:
"[T]he challenged testimony included statements that Thomas made
to his fianc&e and to one of his best friends-in an informal settingthat he purchased his heroin from 'Fat Boy.' Because such statements
were not testimonial, their admission did not implicate the
Confrontation Clause."3 55 Other cases in our survey followed this
same pattern.3 5 6
By contrast to the cases above, the absence of cases involving
statements against interest made to law enforcement is somewhat
puzzling. Looking over the federal case law, we found a few instances
of statements against interest to law enforcement whose admission,
the courts recognized, violated the Confrontation Clause. But these
occurred infrequently in unpublished district court opinions that did
not meet the parameters of our survey. 357 One explanation for this
absence is that the Confrontation Clause violation based on the
admission of statements against interest to law enforcement is so
clear that trial courts regularly exclude such statements or
prosecutors do not offer them, resulting in little formalized litigation
over their admission. Fairly clear guideposts exist in the case law,
such as the Crawford case itself. The Seventh Circuit, for example, in
an opinion endorsing the admission of an against-interest statement

354.

Id.

355.

Id. at 252.

356. See United States v. Veloz, 948 F.3d 418, 431 (1st Cir. 2020) (concluding that
statements to acquaintances admitted as against interest were not testimonial);
United States v. Klemis, 859 F.3d 436, 444 (7th Cir. 2017) ("McKinney's statements to
Singleton and Libbra [admitted as statements against penal interest] reflect
spontaneous attempts to borrow or steal from friends to pay a drug debt, not efforts to
create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."); Brantley v. Harry, No. 2:17-cv13634, 2019 WL 2247733, at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019) ("The Michigan Court of
Appeals correctly concluded that Stoudemire's statement to Wilson was
nontestimonial. The statement was made from one friend to another in an informal
setting soon after the shooting.") (Note: Brantley did not meet the parameters of the
survey).
357. See Moore v. Hooper, No 17-1881, 2017 WL 704987, at *9 (E.D. La. Oct. 13,
2017) (concluding hearsay statement given to law enforcement admitted as statement
against penal interest violated Confrontation Clause); Gaines v. Price, No. 2:15-cv1822, 2017 WL 2296962, at *24-25 (N.D. Ala. May 2, 2017) (concluding similarly that
hearsay statement given to law enforcement admitted as statement against penal
interest violated Confrontation Clause).
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to friends, explains that: "[S]tatements made to persons who are not
law-enforcement personnel are 'much less likely to be testimonial
58
than statements to law enforcement officers."'3 We only pause in
fully endorsing this explanation because our survey revealed other
fairly obvious errors. The frequent appearance of hearsay errors in
the case law weakens the conclusion that prosecutors'and trial courts
conform their behavior to extant legal doctrine. Trial courts (and
prosecutors) do appear to be permitting the introduction of evidence
that violates the Confrontation Clause. They are just doing it through
errors in applying the hearsay rules. That said, the question is one of
degree, and the clarity of the guideposts in this context seem the most
likely explanation. Consequently, we think the absence of statements
against interest to law enforcement in our survey should be
considered a sign of the effectiveness of Crawford in changing one part
of the evidentiary landscape, most suitably in the scenario considered
in Crawford itself.3 5 9
IV. THE STATE OF MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE DOCTRINE

Having analyzed the possible pathways for the admission of outof-court statements and provided a window into how those pathways
interact with modern Confrontation Clause doctrine both as a
theoretical and empirical matter, this Part explores the implications.
As discussed in more detail below, Confrontation Clause doctrine
remains vulnerable to a critique that it has reverted to a minor role
reminiscent of its pre-2004 status. In some ways, the Confrontation
Clause again appears redundant in light of existing hearsay
prohibitions that cover much of the same ground. At the same time,
we show that the critique must be softened since the Clause does
appear to be blocking some pathways to the admission of out-of-court
statements under the hearsay rules or potential extensions of those
rules. More interestingly, we find that the Confrontation Clause, even
in its currently weakened form, does more than screen evidence
properly admitted under nonconstitutional evidence rules. And the
Clause's important, and unappreciated, role as a backstop to faulty

358. Klemis, 859 F.3d at 444.
359. One other possibility is that statements-against-interest played a role in the
Bruton cases we excluded from our survey to the extent the statements were uttered
by co-defendants being jointly tried. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 235 F. Supp. 3d
427, 435 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting the issue of the admissibility of certain statements,
including statements against interest, in consideration of Bruton claim related to
motion to sever that was ultimately denied). We included cases that involved Bruton
and Confrontation Clause analysis, however, so this should not be a major factor.
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hearsay analysis is different from the backstopping role played by the
same constitutional provision under the prior Ohio v. Roberts regime.
Most basically, our analysis supports the argument, voiced by
Justice Scalia, that most of the modern Confrontation Clause's
protections overlap with common, nonconstitutional evidentiary
exclusions. As was the case under Ohio v. Roberts, the Confrontation
Clause will rarely force today's prosecutors to abandon a valid
pathway through a jurisdiction's hearsay rules. We draw this
conclusion from our analysis of the overlap between the two sources
of authority and the striking pattern that emerged in our empirical
survey. We found almost no examples of admissible hearsay being
excluded by the Confrontation Clause.36 0 Instead, almost every court
that found a Confrontation Clause violation did so in a context where
a trial court applied the hearsay rules incorrectly.3 6' These errors
occurred in two frequently repeated scenarios: (1) a trial court
permitted the prosecution to introduce an out-of-court statement
under a hearsay exception, like the public records exception, that did
not, in fact, apply; 36 2 or (2) a trial court allowed the prosecution to
introduce hearsay ostensibly, but incorrectly, for something other
than the truth of the matter asserted.3 63 These findings support
Justice Scalia's accusation to a point. For the most part, the Clause
prohibits what is already prohibited (violations of traditional hearsay
rules) and permits what is already permitted (admission of out-ofcourt statements through the traditional hearsay framework). On the
surface, new Confrontation Clause doctrine looks a lot like old
Confrontation Clause doctrine.
Contrary to Justice Scalia's critique, we also found signs of the
Confrontation Clause's influence that are harder to detect. These
signs suggest: (1) that some admissible hearsay is no longer being
used against criminal defendants; and (2) that the doctrine does more
than just regulate the admission of evidence that is otherwise
admissible under a jurisdiction's hearsay rules. On the first point, the
strongest example is the surprising absence from our survey of the
paradigmatic type of statements against interest: statements by
accomplices to law enforcement.3 6 4 This suggests that Confrontation
Clause doctrine has shifted at least one part of the evidentiary
landscape. Either prosecutors are not offering, or trial courts are not
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 937 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2019).
See, e.g., United States v. Kizzee, 877 F.3d 650, 657-59, 661 (5th Cir. 2017).
See supra Part IV.
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admitting, statements against interest made to law enforcement. As
a result, cases considering this evidence do not appear in our
survey. 36 5 The most likely explanation is a widely shared
understanding that these statements are no longer permitted by the
36 6
Confrontation Clause.
The preceding discussion raises another area where the lack of
cases in our survey suggests that the Confrontation Clause is likely
having an impact: preventing legislatures from creating new hearsay
exceptions as a matter of convenience for overworked government
analysts. Prior to Crawford, affidavits by government officials could
be offered in lieu of live testimony through ad hoc hearsay exceptions
like the statutory provision successfully challenged in Melendez-Diaz
36 7
These types of formal affidavits offered by
v. Massachusetts.
government officials to support a prosecution are, after Crawford and
the subsequent cases, clearly barred by the Confrontation Clause. The
fact that we found no evidence of such statutes still being utilized
suggests that trial courts, prosecutors, and legislators have
36
internalized this shift in the constitutional landscape. 8 So, while the
modern Confrontation Clause may be doing little to prevent
prosecutors from introducing hearsay evidence under traditional
hearsay frameworks (with the one exception noted above), it
nevertheless resists legislative efforts to expand the traditional
hearsay exceptions. This is consistent with our finding of few
Confrontation Clause violations (or even challenges) resulting from
statements admitted through unusual hearsay rules or aggressive
applications of the residual hearsay exception.
The next point our analysis raises about the Confrontation
Clause's hidden effects may be the most important and most
overlooked. Reading high profile Supreme Court opinions crafted after
months of deliberation and in response to comprehensive briefing, it
is easy to forget that the rules governing hearsay are among the most
complex in American law. In the fast paced, high stakes world of trial
365. See supra Part III.
366. Compare supra Part I.E (noting that the Confrontation Clause should
preclude such statements), with supra Part IH.B.8 (noting relative absence of such
statements from the survey in contrast with frequent appearance of other types of
statements against interest).
367. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009) (noting admission
of certificate of analysis under MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13, which has since been
repealed).
368. Friedman, supra note 49, at 46 ("Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming are still the
law, and there is no majority opinion in Williams."); Pardo, supra note 14, at 783
("[T]he confrontation right seems to be moving in different directions for experts and
eyewitnesses.").
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practice, attorneys and judges can be expected to make mistakes. This
means that the Confrontation Clause matters not just through its
effect on otherwise admissible hearsay evidence. The Clause also
plays an important role when it excludes inadmissible hearsay
admitted in error. The Confrontation Clause has narrowed in the
cases after Crawford, but it continues to offer a few clear roadblocks.
Our analysis reveals that those roadblocks come into play not just in
barring evidence that is admissible under the hearsay rules, but also,
and perhaps more importantly, to correct lower courts' errors in
applying nonconstitutional hearsay rules. In theory, this should be
particularly significant because a constitutional hook allows federal
courts to review erroneous state evidentiary rulings and triggers a

less forgiving version of harmless error review.3 6 9 In practice, our
survey shows that these factors are not leading to a substantial
number of reversals due to the courts' willingness to find even
constitutional errors to be harmless.

370

Finally, it is important to note that the post-Crawfordnarrowing
of the confrontation right should not be equated-as it was by Justice
Scalia-with a return to Ohio v. Roberts. True, the cases that followed
Crawford made modern Confrontation Clause doctrine less
restrictive, but the respective doctrines' distinct emphases result in
distinct vulnerabilities. Under Roberts, the focus was on reliability.
This eased the admission of out-of-court statements like affidavits
filed by government bureaucrats. Under Crawford, the exclusionary
focus shifts to evidence generated as a substitute for trial testimony.
Modern policymakers can craft new hearsay exceptions that admit
hearsay of questionable reliability, like text messages and social
media posts, but cannot allow more formal hearsay like affidavits of
government chemists. 37 1 As our analysis shows, this impact may be
most important not, with respect to existing hearsay rules, but in
preventing changes to those rules and correcting errors in applying
them. Under Roberts, the Confrontation Clause was available to
correct trial court errors in hearsay analysis that admitted unreliable
369. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011); United States v. Caraballo,
595 F.3d 1214, 1229 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010); Brantley v. Harry, No. 2:17-cv-13634, 2019
WL 2247733, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019); supra Part IH.B.7.
370. See supra Part III.B.7.
371. See Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford's ConfrontationRight in A DigitalAge,
45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 33, 41-42 (2012) (noting limited application of modern
Confrontation Clause to "the informal electronic communications that will
increasingly dominate our discourse"); cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51
(2004) (contrasting hearsay and confrontation analysis of "off-hand, overheard
remark[s]" and "ex parte examinations").
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hearsay. Prime candidates for exclusion included casual statements
37 2
Under
to friends and acquaintances about later litigated events.
373
Crawford, such statements escape constitutional scrutiny. Instead,
modern Confrontation Clause doctrine backstops errors involving the
admission of formal accusations. 374 While we should expect courts to
continue to make errors throughout the hearsay framework, only
errors that occur in connection with official records or solemn
accusations will receive constitutional scrutiny.
CONCLUSION

The Sixth Amendment commands that the defendant in a criminal
375
trial must "be confronted with the witnesses against him."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has long permitted prosecutors to
introduce the out-of-court statements of absent declarants to convict
criminal defendants. Twice, the Court has attempted to draw a clear
line to distinguish those statements that can be admitted without
confrontation from those that cannot. Commentators roundly
criticized the line the Court drew in 1980 as redundant to existing
nonconstitutional hearsay rules. The Court drew a new line in 2004.
Our analysis reveals that the new line, as subsequently interpreted
by the Supreme Court, is vulnerable to a similar charge.
Our analysis, also reveals the importance of recognizing the
Confrontation Clause's impact beyond its regulation of evidence
admitted through existing hearsay pathways. Constitutional doctrine
changes the options available to policymakers to expand hearsay
exceptions beyond traditional bounds. Most importantly, it offers a
critical backstop against trial courts' hearsay errors. The frequency of
those errors revealed by our survey suggests that the shift from
Roberts to Crawford with respect to which errors receive
constitutional scrutiny is an important, and overlooked, aspect of the
modern confrontation right.
In sum, the Confrontation Clause matters, but it matters in
different ways and to a lesser degree than both the Supreme Court's
rhetoric and modern scholarship celebrating the "Crawford
revolution" suggest.

372.
373.

See supra Part III.B.6, 8.
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

374. Id.
375.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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